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The Hellenic Observatory at the LSE was delighted to be able to 
establish the ‘A.C. Laskaridis Post-Doctoral Fellowship’ in 2007. The 
fellowship was expressly focussed on supporting new, post-doctoral 
researchers pursuing projects on contemporary Greece within one 
or more of the social sciences. As such, the fellowship offered an 
important bridge for the recipient between the completion of 
his/her doctoral thesis, with its standard constraints and monitor- 
ing, to a new phase of greater self-responsibility for producing a 
fresh, high-quality scholarly contribution. This is an important tran- 
sition for any academic: seizing the opportunity of greater auton- 
omy to design and pursue a worthy new piece of work. 
At the same time, the fellowship offered a means by which the 
recipient could enhance his/her professional profile in a difficult job 
market. The fellowship supported those working in the field of con- 
temporary Greek studies, by placing them in a stronger position by 
which to compete for higher posts, more broadly defined in their 
scope. As such, the fellowship showed confidence in the develop- 
ment of scholarship on Greece in an international setting. 
Once established, the fellowship operated according to the estab- 
lished LSE procedures. Throughout, Mr Athanasios Laskaridis main- 
tained the high standards of philanthropic giving that the School has 
been proud to receive from Greece, working collaboratively to create 
new opportunities, while also recognising the academic independence 
of the School. We are deeply appreciative of his support. 
In advertising the fellowship, we were heartened by the number 
and quality of the applications we received. On no occasion was the 
selection process easy: applicants had been required to submit a 
full outline of their new research projects, distinct from their PhD 
theses. The ‘market’ produced excellent and innovative projects for 
research on Greece today. This in itself was evidence of the vital- 
ity of the field and of the latest trends in scholarship. 
In the event, the LSE committee selected five outstanding young 
researchers. Each fulfilled the obligations of the fellowship ad- 
mirably. They engaged fully in the activities of the Hellenic Obser- 
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vatory, as well as the European Institute and the wider School. I be- 
lieve they took full advantage of the opportunities and resources of- 
fered to researchers by the LSE. By the end of their period with us, 
they produced new research papers and articles on their own proj- 
ects in a variety of academic outlets. 
In recognition of the success of the fellowship, we thought it ap- 
propriate to take this opportunity to bring together papers by each 
of our fellows that reflect on the research projects they conducted 
whilst at the LSE. The reader will recognise the range, originality, 
and quality of their work. 
My colleagues and I were proud to host these young researchers 
and we commend their work to you. 
 
Kevin Featherstone 
Eleftherios Venizelos Professor of Contemporary Greek Studies 
and Professor of European Politics 
Hellenic Observatory Director 
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This chapter examines majority-immigrant relations through the 
prism of welfare provision to glean insight into the extent to which 
the welfare system influences the integration of immigrants into 
Greek society. Does welfare provision help lead to social cohesion 
between the majority society and immigrant minorities? Are exist- 
ing majority-immigrant tensions abated, or exacerbated, by the wel- 
fare system? What is the role of welfare provision in relation to other 
integration factors such as labour market participation, naturalisa- 
tion, and broadening conceptions of host society identity? These 
questions are addressed through in-depth qualitative research con- 
ducted in a Greek town. The research indicates that immigrant in- 
tegration is largely influenced by local level policies and by immi- 
grants’ daily encounters with people who carry these out. 
Keywords: welfare, immigration, integration, local policy, diversity. 
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the Templeton foundation. The author’s thanks are due to each of 
these funding bodies, as well as to Nikos Kokosalakis, Grace Davie 
and Lina Molokotos-Liederman, with whom I had the pleasure to 
work in these earlier projects. Some of the arguments elaborated 
below are also included in an article to be published in the Jour- 
nal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (Fokas, 2014) 
and appear here with its publisher’s permission. 
1. Introduction 
Though it is at the national level that both immigration and welfare 
policies are formulated, local authorities are increasingly au- 
tonomous in their response to diversity in cities, whether by com- 
plementing, contradicting, or pre-empting national level policies. As 
Michael Alexander (2003) notes, local policies include the estab- 
lishment of immigrant advisory councils; the allocation of extra re- 
sources in education, health and welfare services; the deliberate ex- 
clusion of immigrant organisations; ethnic enclave dispersal efforts; 
and implicit or explicit fortification of ethnic enclaves. 
As a result of such broad-reaching and contradictory policies, 
the city is emerging as a distinct unit of study (Alexander 2003; 
Brenner 1999). This point is buttressed by Michael Lipsky’s (1980) 
contention that public policies are not best understood as made in 
legislatures; rather, much more relevant to immigrants’ realities are 
their daily encounters, in crowded offices, with ‘street-level bu- 
reaucrats’ carrying out those policies. ‘Street-level bureaucrats’ are 




civil servants who interact with and have extensive discretion over 
the dispensation of benefits and the allocation of public sanctions. 
According to Lipsky, ‘the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the 
routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with un- 
certainties and work pressures, effectively become the public poli- 
cies they carry out’ (1980: xii). 
This chapter presents empirical reflections on immigrants’ ex- 
periences of the local welfare system in the Greek town of Thiva, a 
medium-sized town (pop. just over 24,000) situated 85 km NW of 
Athens in mainland Greece, in the region of Viotia. These experi- 
ences, studied through qualitative research conducted during field- 
work stays in Thiva, sustain the notion that immigrant integration is 
largely influenced by local level policies and by immigrants’ daily en- 
counters with people who carry these out. By choosing welfare as 
the domain of policies and practices to be examined in a particu- 
lar locality, we gain important insight into the role of welfare provi- 
sion (or lack thereof) in immigrant integration in Greece. 
The research in Thiva focuses on the points of interaction be- 
tween immigrants and majority society in the provision of welfare, 
in the context of increasing diversity and aimed at understanding 
the influences on immigrant integration in that context. My re- 
search question is situated within debates over what, really, results 
in immigrant integration: incorporation into the labour market, reg- 
ularisation and eventual naturalisation, or a requisite degree of 
identity transformation of the host society? By adding welfare pro- 
vision to the mix of factors through the research in Thiva, four 
themes emerge highlighting both the potential and the failures of 
welfare provision in leading to immigrant integration into the 
broader Greek society. Following a sketch of the theoretical frame- 
work for this chapter, a subsequent section includes a brief in- 
troduction to the town and its welfare system and to the research 
methods used; a third section presents relevant findings from the 
fieldwork conducted in Thiva before conclusions are drawn in a 
final section. 
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2. Theoretical underpinnings 
The terms welfare, diversity and integration are vague and require 
explicit definition. By welfare in the present context we mean formal 
local level welfare services such as health care, education, care for 
the disabled and the elderly, and housing for those in need, unem- 
ployment benefits and employment schemes, etc. which are provided 
by the state and/or by the European Union through various EU-sup- 
ported programmes, but also ‘informal’ forms of welfare provision of- 
fered by e.g. the local Orthodox Church and a range of private as- 
sociations. The diversity examined here is that specifically arising from 
immigration and thus in the case of Thiva encompasses ethnic, racial 
and religious difference. In terms of integration, there are structural, 
socio-cultural, and identity dimensions at play; generally the three di- 
mensions are interconnected and seen as levels of progressive in- 
tegration, starting from the structural and culminating in identity -- 
i.e., acceptance of ‘them’ as part of ‘us’ (Vermeulen 2004: 28). 
Literature on immigrant welfare in Greece carries little discussion 
on the role of the welfare system as such in the integration process1. 
Instead some analysts focus on economic integration as the key to 
eventual socio-cultural integration2. From this perspective, incorpo- 
ration into the labour market is perceived as the first critical step to 
be taken in the process of integration: ‘By providing a regular income, 
independence, self-esteem, security and opportunities for social 
recognition, employment is the key to effective integration’ (Fakiolas 
2004: 271). But, as Fakiolas notes, employment stability does not 
necessarily lead to social integration (2004: 272). Economic inte- 
gration can negatively affect social integration if job competition de- 
velops between the majority community and immigrants. In this 
sense, social acceptance of immigrants by a local community might 
 
1 One notable exception is Maratou-Alipranti and Gazon 2005. 
2 Fakiolas 2004, Cavounidis 2006, Baldwin-Edwards 2004, Glytsos N. 1995, Iosifidis 
1997, Lianos et.al., 1996, Markova and Sarris 1997, Dimoulas et.al. 2005, Kapsalis 
2005, Maratou-Alipranti 1999, and Chletsos 1996 all engage with this notion, some 
from a critical standpoint. 




actually be enhanced in situations where immigrants are limited to 
‘illegal’ employment, in employment domains where the local com- 
munity would not work in any case. This then raises the question of 
whether integration necessitates regularisation. 
In fact, some scholars argue that integration is only possible 
through full regularisation and, eventually, naturalisation. Lazaridis and 
Poyago-Theotoky contend that naturalisation is ‘the only secure means 
of full incorporation into the society and polity’ (1999: 731; emphasis 
mine). In the Greek case, two conspicuous problems arise in this sce- 
nario. First, the Greek naturalisation process, particularly pre-20103, 
is amongst the most strict, arduous and expensive (with the highest 
nominal application fee for nationality) in Europe (MBE 2004: 18-19). 
Second, the Greek naturalisation system is highly ethnicised, granting 
significant preference to ethnic Greeks over other foreigners. 
This leads us to a third body of scholarship focusing on the iden- 
tity dimension of integration and, specifically, on the problem of eth- 
nicity-based exclusion of immigrants as a major challenge to im- 
migrant integration. Based on migration studies expert Stephen 
Castles’ (1995) categorisation of immigrant countries, Greece be- 
longs to the ‘differential exclusionary model’ of immigration policy. 
This model is found in countries where the dominant definition of 
the nation is that of a community of birth and descent – i.e. jus san- 
guinis instead of just soli (right of blood rather than right ‘of the soil’, 
and ethnic versus civic). In such contexts majority society is un- 
willing to accept immigrants as members of the nation, or in Ver- 
meulen’s formulation, as ‘us’ (2004: 28). Differential exclusion en- 
tails immigrants’ partial incorporation into society, so that they 
may be incorporated into the labour market but excluded, for ex- 
ample, from welfare benefits, citizenship, etc. The point casts doubt 
 
3 In March 2010 the Greek government voted in law no. 3838/2010 on citizenship 
and naturalisation, significantly relaxing the naturalisation regime (Gropas and 
Triandafyllidou 2012), but the constitutionality of this law was challenged in February 
2011 in the 4th Chamber of the Greek State Council, since which point the status 
of the legislation is in flux. 
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on integration expectations based on labour market participation: 
immigrants can indeed be – and remain – wanted, for certain types 
of labour, but unwelcome (see Ambrosini 1997). 
The research in Thiva resonates with each of these three per- 
spectives in one way or another. But neither approach in and of it- 
self gives us a very full picture of immigrant integration prospects 
and trends. A synthesis of these approaches, and a placing of the 
research question into the broader framework of welfare provision, 
helps in this regard. 
 
3. Thiva in context 
As home to a (though decreasing) number of factories and to a well- 
developed agricultural industry, Thiva has a relatively strong immi- 
gratory pull which is buttressed by its proximity to Athens. A boom 
in the 1970s and early 80s in the establishment of factories there 
began descending by the 1990s. Factory closures are, to a large 
extent, responsible for the relatively high unemployment rate: in the 
period between 1981 and 1991, Thiva saw an unemployment rate 
increase of 184% (compared to 102% nationally) (see Fokas 2006). 
Meanwhile, Thiva’s well-developed agricultural industry (mainly cot- 
ton, oil, cereals and potato), serves as a pull factor particularly for 
undocumented (‘illegal’) immigrants, as agricultural work forms a 
large part of the Greek underground economy. 
Thiva is a relatively diverse Greek town, not only because of the 
internal and external migration drawn by the factories and agricul- 
tural work, but also because the town was home to a housing com- 
plex established for the refugees who came to Greece in the early 
1920’s as part of a population exchange following the Greco-Turk- 
ish War (1919-1922)4. Over time, this ‘old refugees’ settlement’ 
 
4 The Greek refugees from Asia Minor were settled in various parts of Greece, and such 
‘old refugee’ neighbourhoods as that in Thiva are scattered throughout Greece. The 
Lausanne Treaty setting out the population exchange also set special terms under 
which a minority of Greeks could continue living in Istanbul and a minority of Turks 
in the Greek region of Thrace. 




(palios prosfigikos sunoikismos) has accommodated a chain of im- 
migrants coming to Thiva. Today it remains a symbolic and tangible 
focal point for immigrants: it is now comprised mainly of first gen- 
eration immigrants and serves as a ‘first stop’ for many newcomers, 
not least due to the extremely low rent (e.g., €50-100j per month). 
Τhere are no statistics available in Thiva with exact numbers for 
ethnicities or religions represented in the town. The Thiva ‘Office for 
Foreigners’, the municipality’s office dealing with the issuing of res- 
idence papers to immigrants, does not keep even informal statistics 
about the country of origin of applicants for residence papers. Ac- 
cordingly, only estimates may be made regarding the size of vari- 
ous groups, on the basis of cross-referencing numbers cited by a 
range of sources. Estimations cited by the Thiva Office for Foreign- 
ers and the deputy mayor of Thiva who deals specifically with mi- 
nority issues, set the sizes of the largest immigrant groups who had 
at least sought registered status in Thiva at the time of the research 
at approximately 1,500 Albanians, 500 Pakistanis, 450 Indians, 400 
Romanians, and 100 Bulgarians. 
 
3.1 The local welfare system 
The government welfare provisions in Thiva can be described as as 
limited and poor as in the rest of Greece. The Greek welfare system 
is highly centralised, and so the gaps in the system overall are also 
broadly present in the case of Thiva. In terms of local welfare ac- 
tivity, in Thiva as in most Greek municipalities, the bulk of welfare 
services are based in the Welfare Office of the Prefecture5, which 
deals mainly with the provision of benefits to people with disabili- 
ties and the uninsured, and one-off allowances for emergency sit- 
uations (e.g. natural disasters). 
The municipalities themselves do not have ‘welfare offices’; 
rather, welfare activity is carried out only on an ad-hoc and gener- 
 
5 The Viotia Prefecture Welfare Office is based in Livadeia, approximately 40km from 
Thiva. 




ally short-term basis and is based mainly at a ‘Municipal Enterprise’ 
in each municipality. Many EU-funded social programmes, in par- 
ticular, are based at municipal enterprises. Other EU-funded pro- 
grammes are run by private individuals or companies; one such in 
Thiva is the Centre for Antiracist Support (Kentro Antiratsistikis Ypo- 
stiriksis - KAYP), with a remit to help immigrants, repatriates and 
refugees to overcome any race-related barriers and to be integrated 
into the workforce. 
Given the relatively limited Greek welfare system, gaps are covered 
by the EU, as noted above, but also by the family and the Orthodox 
Church (see Fokas 2006, Fokas and Molokotos-Liederman 2010). 
Welfare activities carried out by the Orthodox Church in Thiva include 
a home for the elderly; a facility for the housing and care for people 
with physical disabilities and chronic illnesses; and a soup kitchen. 
(Notably, there are no state-run homes for the elderly, facilities for peo- 
ple with disabilities, or soup kitchens in Thiva). All of the above is or- 
ganised and administered at the level of the diocese, but each parish 
has its own programme of welfare activities, and a financial account 
for help for the poor to which parishioners can donate money. 
There are also several private institutions present in Thiva which 
have no formal or administrative relationship with the church but are 
linked to it or to the Orthodox faith in some way. These include an or- 
phanage, a home for the elderly, and a ‘religious association’ that prac- 
tices internal and external missionary work. Finally, most of the mi- 
nority groups in Thiva also have some form of established association, 
at various levels of formality, offering different forms of social care 
within each group, though none is strictly a ‘welfare institution’. 
 
3.2 Methods and sources 
Insight into the influence of the local welfare system on immigrant 
integration has been sought through two main research methods: 
in-depth interviews, and participant observation. In terms of the first, 
this chapter draws on information gleaned through 72 semi-struc- 
tured in-depth interviews. Of these interviews, approximately half 




were conducted with members of the majority population, and half 
with immigrants. In the first group, members of the civil service, Or- 
thodox priests, social workers, representatives of private associations 
administering welfare aid, journalists and members of the general 
public living in the ‘old refugees’ settlement’ were interviewed. 
In the second group, interviews were conducted with the largest 
immigrant groupings which represent the main source of change in 
Thiva as regards increasing ethnic, racial and religious diversity. 
These can be loosely grouped into the following three categories: Al- 
banians (male and female, of three different generations, and em- 
ployed in a broad range of settings); Pakistanis and Indians (all male, 
working mainly in agriculture); and Poles, Lithuanians, Bulgarians, 
Albanians, Serbs and Romanians (all female and working mainly in 
domestic settings), all of whom have immigrated to Greece with no 
immediate plans for return or resettlement elsewhere. 
The second main method employed in the research is participant 
observation, particularly in civil service points of interaction between 
immigrants and the majority population. The general work of the Of- 
fice for Foreigners, the Prefectural headquarters, the Centre for An- 
tiracist Support, and the local police station were observed on sev- 
eral occasions. Observation of the interaction between the local 
Greek population and the immigrant population in the ‘Old refugees’ 
settlement’, and in immigrants’ work places, also formed an im- 
portant part of the research. Finally, the research also entails a 
search of the local print media for material related to immigrant 
groups. 
 
4. Immigrant welfare in Thiva - the evidence 
The research points to four major factors and mechanisms influ- 
encing immigrants’ integration into broader society. The relation of 
each to welfare provision brings to light both the great potential and 
the significant failures of the Greek welfare structures (formal and 
informal) in the process of immigrant integration. Each of these is 
addressed below. 




4.1 ‘Welfare is a luxury’: immigration policy as a hurdle 
For the vast majority of immigrants consulted for this study, ‘the pa- 
pers’ – i.e., the process of attaining and renewing residence papers 
which allow them to be legally employed – is by far the greatest chal- 
lenge to their individual welfare and a major hurdle in the integra- 
tion process. The problem of ‘the papers’ renders the notion of wel- 
fare recipiency a non-issue, a distant luxury compared to 
immigrants’ long drawn-out struggle to secure their presence in 
Thiva and to gain access to legal employment there. Thus as far as 
incorporation in the labour market goes as a key step towards full 
integration into society, in Thiva that step is largely barred by the 
prerequisite process of attaining residence permits. 
At the time of the research, no new applications for residence 
permits were being received. But even the required bi-annual re- 
newal of permits is a bureaucratically complicated and long process, 
in which the most conspicuous problem is that of delays. Accord- 
ing to the legislation, the immigrants’ permits should be ready two 
months after the application is submitted; but in Thiva, the normal 
waiting period is 6 months to one year, and in the experience of sev- 
eral immigrant interviewees, it is often over 18 months. ‘We’ve been 
paying for 10 years, declares one interviewee, ‘and my husband has 
never, not once, actually received the permit’. Questioning why the 
state takes their money if ‘they don’t want us’, the couple concludes 
that the state is ‘stealing from immigrants’. 
The delays result in a continued state of insecurity for the im- 
migrants who remain in the meantime without the proper docu- 
mentation. In lieu of the residence permit, immigrants are given a 
certificate (vevaiosi) indicating that they have successfully submit- 
ted their renewal applications. However, without a valid residence 
permit in hand, immigrants are not secured re-entry into Greece, 
even though legally the certificate ought to suffice. There are many 
cases of abuse of power whereby the border police do not allow re- 
entry, and manipulation whereby immigrants manage to cross the 
borders only by paying someone to get them past the border police. 




Immigrant respondents also issue complaints about the poor 
treatment they receive from civil servants working in the field of im- 
migration policy. One related complaint is that the civil servants will 
‘ask for things one at a time’. As one respondent notes: ‘The lady 
will send me back five times to get something … “Oh, I need this 
too”, and when I come back with that, she asks for something 
new… and in the meantime I have to leave work to do this. They 
treat me horribly’. 
There is of course an ‘other side of the coin’ to immigration pol- 
icy – the experience of the civil servants meant to implement it. The 
problem of the volume of legislation is palpable: civil servants find 
it difficult to keep up with the two main laws which are 30-50 pages 
each and ‘the 60-70 explanatory texts, some of which are as long 
as the laws themselves’, according to a police officer working in im- 
migration issues. This problem is exacerbated by the fact the Thiva 
Office for Foreigners is grossly understaffed, with only two people 
processing the bi-annual applications for renewal of approx. 3,000 
residence permits. Further, the resources in the office are ex- 
tremely poor, with no filing cabinets for the piles of plain folders, and 
one un-used computer as the staff members had not yet been 
trained to use the programme developed for processing the appli- 
cations. This situation shapes the ‘street-level bureaucrats’’ admin- 
istering of immigration policy (Lipsky 1980; Psimmenos and Kas- 
simati 2003; the same of course applies in other areas of civil 
service). Thus one civil servant based in a Livadeia office states: ‘This 
is the worst job…This job is a punishment’ . 
Finally, there are cost-related problems of ‘the papers’. The re- 
newal of the residence permits costs 300 euro biannually which, for 
some immigrants, is a considerable percentage of their disposable 
income. Additionally, if the applicant’s social security payments 
have not been made by his or her employer, he or she will also have 
to pay social security contributions out of pocket. In many cases im- 
migrants find it necessary to hire a lawyer in order to help them 
through the complicated and ever changing legislation. 




4.2 ‘Prisoners of legality’: competition versus exploitation 
In spite of tremendous efforts made by immigrants to secure resi- 
dence permits and thus legal rights to reside and work in Thiva, there 
is a debate about the relative benefits of ‘legalisation’, in terms of im- 
migrant integration into society. Clearly residence permits are a pre- 
requisite to naturalisation, which is a prerequisite to receiving state 
welfare provision on par with the majority society. But being ‘on par’ 
with the majority society may also entail competition – perceived or 
real – with the local majority population for legal employment and 
thus lead to tension rather than cohesion between immigrants and 
the majority population. Key to this problem is the financial cost of 
legality, in terms of required social security contributions, which of 
course also entails social costs. One civil servant notes: 
They [immigrants] get the jobs instead of us [‘Greeks’]. Be- 
cause she has the same rights as me but will get paid less. 
500 euro per month to clean a house; Greek women would 
never work for that amount. 
More than competition between the majority population and im- 
migrant minorities, in Thiva this problem arises mainly between dif- 
ferent immigrant groups, developing cleavages within the immigrant 
communities along documented-undocumented lines. One Albanian 
explains: 
They take…illegal immigrants. Because this way they don’t 
have to pay insurance. We, because we are legal, have a hard 
time finding work. We look to tomorrow, not just to today. They 
[the new immigrants] are so desperate that they can think 
of just today. We need legal status especially for the kids, be- 
cause otherwise they will not be able to be admitted to or re- 
ceive a degree from the university…I go to apply for work at 
a factory, they say they will consider my application and get 
back to me, and then I learn that the post was filled by an il- 
legal immigrant, someone without papers always gets the 
job...I am legal, and I have no rights. 
While competition is a complaint voiced by many who have achieved 




documented status, many undocumented immigrants experience ex- 
ploitation as the alternative. This is most pervasively the case in the daily 
waged agricultural work that undocumented immigrants tend to do. ‘If 
they had papers’, one Pakistani man states, referring to newer arrivals 
from Pakistan, ‘they wouldn’t take such badly paid jobs’. 
The manipulation begins, in many cases, in their home countries 
in some form of human trafficking. For example, many Pakistanis 
have paid ‘agencies’ in Pakistan to find the individuals work upon 
their arrival in Greece and to settle their residence papers. According 
to the local police, there had been two recent cases of kidnapping 
of Pakistanis by these ‘agents’ when the former were unable to make 
the payments. 
Another example of exploitation, and discrimination, lies in the ex- 
perience of some minorities in the housing market. One Albanian young 
woman recalls that when she and her family moved to Thiva more than 
a decade ago many advertisements for rent in the local newspaper ex- 
plicitly excluded Albanian applicants and, in cases where they were 
considered as potential tenants, the prices were raised significantly, so 
that Albanians had to pay a premium for their ethnicity6. 
 
4.3 ‘Hierarchy of Greekness’ and ethnic discrimination 
This point leads us to the topic of ethnicity-based discrimination and 
stereotyping and the relative prospects for the acceptance of im- 
migrants as part of the broader society – i.e., the identity dimension. 
One element of the identity dimension is discrimination between ‘Al- 
banians’ and ‘ethnic Greek Albanians’ (Northern Epirots), in what 
Triandafyllidou and Veikou (2002) describe as a ‘hierarchy of 
Greekness’ which is embedded both in legislation, as noted above, 
and to an extent in majority population perceptions. But while poli- 
cies and some attitudes may be relatively positive towards ethnic 
 
6 This is a trend also noted in research in other parts of Greece (see Hatziprokopiou 
2003). In my study of the local print media I was unable to find such adverts, but 
they are likely to have appeared in print ten years ago. 




Greek Albanians, ethnic stereotyping does not work in a neat hier- 
archy whereby one might expect ethnic Greek Albanians closest to 
majority Greek sympathies, followed by Albanians and then work- 
ing geographically and culturally further east. Rather, the factors in- 
volved in shaping attitudes towards various immigrant groups are 
many, yielding complex results. 
For example, though Albanians are the most integrated in terms 
of labour market participation and lifestyle and housing, it is in re- 
lation to Albanians especially that most negative stereotypes abound 
in Thiva. Criticism of Albanians includes such comments as ‘they are 
arrogant and not straight-forward … we know from everyone that the 
Albanians are the worst race’ (this from the director of one private 
welfare-providing association); ‘Albanians are sly. Not only sly, but 
dangerous’ says an employee in an EU-funded programme ex- 
tending welfare services to immigrants. An Albanian child, though 
born in Greece, reports that she is teased in school by other chil- 
dren, being called ‘bad names’ such as ‘Albanian’7. 
In contrast to perceptions of Albanians, attitudes towards Indi- 
ans and Pakistanis are generally and notably positive. ‘Quiet’, ‘re- 
spectful’, ‘honest’, ‘with traditions and values’, are common de- 
scriptions used by members of the majority population to describe 
these groups. Indians and Pakistanis cite very good relations with 
their employers (and vice versa). Though different in physical (dark 
skinned), linguistic (little-to-no Greek), and religious (Muslim or Sikh) 
terms, in terms of tolerance and acceptance by the majority popu- 
lation, both the Pakistani and the Indian immigrants seem to be do- 
ing relatively well in Thiva, whether due to or in spite of being at the 
bottom of the employment ladder. 
There is however one significant and telling exception to that ac- 
ceptance by the majority population. In the ‘old refugees’ settlement’, 
 
7 Of course, Albanians are an exceptional group in forming such a large percentage 
of the total immigrant population and in being the first large group to arrive in Thiva 
(and Greece in general). 




Pakistanis especially live in the most dilapidated houses, some with 
no indoor toilet or running water and often housing several men per 
small house. In this context, extremely negative attitudes are ex- 
pressed by the majority population regarding the Pakistanis and the 
few Indians who live there, particularly complaints about poor hy- 
giene and cleanliness. ‘These are Muslims who cannot be inte- 
grated’, indicates one civil servant working in the area; ‘They are not 
generally welcome. And if you see us as a bit racist, we’re also jus- 
tified’. 
Notably, in the same ‘old refugees’ settlement’ context, several 
members of the majority population did speak favourably about their 
Albanian neighbours but, in most cases, only about their immedi- 
ate neighbours. They are accepted as neighbours, even if they are 
not generally accepted as co-habitants of Thiva – a common phe- 
nomenon described by Durkheim as ‘mechanic solidarity’8. The ex- 
ample from the old refugees’ settlement is highly suggestive of the 
contextuality of the identity dimension immigrant integration. 
 
4.4 Who minds the gaps? Formal and informal welfare provision 
Who tends to the gaps in the welfare system, and to what effect in 
terms of immigrant integration? One especially prominent welfare 
need of many Thiva immigrants is Greek language tuition, given that 
language would largely improve prospects for labour market inte- 
gration and in socio-cultural integration. In Thiva at the time of the 
research, there was not a single course on offer for beginner’s Greek 
(a tremendous necessity especially for Pakistanis and Indians). The 
municipality is a likely provider, not least because of the EU funds 
coming into Thiva specifically for that purpose. Although both at the 
prefectural and the local level there are some language-learning pro- 
grammes, these reach an extremely small proportion of the immi- 
grants, and most Pakistanis and Indians are unaware of their ex- 
 
8 On this point in relation to further research in the Greek context, see Kiprianos et al. 
2003. 




istence. As a former local deputy mayor explains, the programmes 
were advertised on Greek language posters and through the inter- 
net, in Greek, so of course few Pakistanis and Indians would have 
had access to the information. The local OAED (Greek Manpower Em- 
ployment Organisation) office receives funding for programmes to 
prepare immigrants for the job market, and employs it by operat- 
ing an advanced Greek language course, focused on written Greek. 
Thus at least part of the gap in this domain is covered. 
One private EU-funded programme for immigrant support is an- 
other likely home for such courses, given its remit to help immi- 
grants, repatriates and refugees to overcome any race-related bar- 
riers and to be integrated into the workforce in Thiva. After 
explaining in detail the intense competition in Thiva to win such pro- 
grammes, specifically because of the significant amounts of money 
involved, one representative responds to the question of why it does 
not offer such a language learning programme by asking what ben- 
efit this would have for the programme and its director. In general, 
language, then, is the locus of a problematic situation which certainly 
limits the integration potential of a number of immigrants. And fund- 
ing earmarked for such purposes is not fulfilling the aim. 
In terms of the Orthodox Church role, as noted above, the 
church is highly active in the welfare domain, including the home 
for the elderly, soup kitchen, and centre for the disabled. But these 
more formal elements of church activity are not used by immigrants. 
According to clerics and church representatives, they are not sought 
out by immigrants. Meanwhile, no immigrant consulted was aware 
of these church activities. But clerics claim to carry out other in- 
formal and less conspicuous activities: e.g., by offering immigrants 
employment cleaning the church, pruning the garden and cleaning 
the grounds outside, etc. 
Of the ‘church-related’ private institutions in Thiva, only one group 
is actively involved in welfare provision to immigrant groups. This as- 
sociation collects food, clothing, furniture, etc. donated by its mem- 
bers and distributes these to the local poor upon request. Primarily 




Albanians, Romanians and Bulgarians seek goods from the associ- 
ation; no Indians or Pakistanis have ever sought help there. Ac- 
cording to its director, ‘They [Indians and Pakistanis] don’t ask, they 
need little to be satisfied’. Pakistani and Indian respondents were 
unaware of the existence of the Association, also likely due to lan- 
guage barriers. 
Finally, of the immigrant groups’ own associations, only those of 
the Indians and Pakistanis actively provide certain welfare services 
in a semi-organised fashion. Albanians, the largest immigrant group, 
do not have any centralised association and tend to congregate in 
‘social groups’ based on their areas of origin, for social events and 
carrying out no welfare activity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The experiences of immigrants in Thiva point to several domains in 
which either formal or informal welfare provision to immigrants – 
whether through legal aid offered for the process of renewing ‘the 
papers’; language tuition for a range of levels of Greek language 
knowledge or lack thereof; material goods made available to those 
living in below-poverty standards; or housing aid for those living in 
the most dilapidated of buildings in the ‘old refugees’ settlement’ – 
could significantly change the current reality of immigrant integra- 
tion, which is marked more by evidence of diversity challenging so- 
cial integration. Though the ‘hierarchy of Greekness’ in the case of 
Thiva is non-linear, it is ever present both at the national level of poli- 
cies, but also – and more critically – in local level formal and in- 
formal policies and in the daily encounters of immigrants with 
those who carry these out, many of whom express stereotypes re- 
garding different immigrant groups. ‘Us’ and ‘them’ remains a 
functional dichotomy, and ‘them’ is also divided from within and ex- 
ternally, on the basis of both ethnicity and immigration status 
(which are, in some ways, interrelated). 
Certainly the evidence from Thiva suggests that each stage in the 
process of immigrant integration is plagued by hurdles, and neither 




labour market integration, regularisation and naturalisation, nor 
opening of Greek conceptions of ‘us’ to include immigrants, may be 
a stand-alone formula for immigrant integration. Welfare provision 
however, if not formal than at the informal level, if practiced effec- 
tively and sincerely in line with the policy thinking behind it, would 
significantly improve immigrant integration at each stage. 
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This article examines the dynamic between the process of Bulgaria’s 
Europeanization and the flow of Foreign Direct Investments to the 
country in its industrial base. A critical differentiation between 
speculative and non-speculative FDI is drawn while determining that 
the geographic origin of investments matters. Greek FDI, in partic- 
ular, emerges as a major source of strategic regional investments 
in Bulgaria’s industry highlighting the significance of regional trade 
and cooperation for the long-term economic outlook not only for the 
host country, but also for the region, by enhancing the area of eco- 
nomic progress and development. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union (EU) in 
2007, it is time to take stock of the profound transformation that the 
state has undergone since first lodging an application for mem- 
bership in the early 1990s. The change is nowhere more manifest 
than in the area of economic activity and development. Lingering crit- 
icism from the European Commission over the full attainment of po- 
litical criteria, such as the universal application of the rule of law, 
the gradual adaptation to the institutions and the acquis commu- 
nautaire of the EU and the parallel process of deeper integration, 
as well as the adequacy of administrative absorption capacities in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) notwithstanding, all of the new 
EU-12 member states satisfactorily fulfilled the Copenhagen eco- 
nomic criteria for accession1. 
The relative ‘poverty’ of Bulgaria left its economy oblivious to the 
direct impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The neg- 
ative externalities of the bulk of the defaulting market instruments 
 
1 European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, 
pp. 12-ff. 




associated with various kinds of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
and the over-leveraging of households and financial institutions was 
never a threat to an unexposed market. However, the lack of a neg- 
ative direct impact was offset by an inability at central government 
level to reverse the snow-balling repercussions which manifested 
themselves primarily in the shortage of liquidity resulting from the 
majority foreign-owned bank subsidiary system tightened up private 
sector lending criteria. This exacerbated the rise of private debt2, al- 
ready spurred on by the commodity bubble in anticipation of Bul- 
garia’s EU accession in 2007. The shortage of liquidity intensified 
with the sharp withdrawal of foreign direct investments (FDI), 
where Bulgaria had become the most FDI reliant economy in CEE 
by 2009. 
How to maintain development in a state under such circum- 
stances has turned into the most challenging stumbling block after 
the last financial crisis in Bulgaria in 1996-73. This enquiry posits 
two sub-questions: (1) how effectively was Bulgaria’s economic tran- 
sition steered during the EU accession period; and (2) how disparate 
was the effect of FDI in the country? The discussion ensuing from 
these two primary questions provides some insights into the kinds 
of economic reform, on the one hand, and the specific mix of FDI 
concentration, on the other, that is needed for development. If cur- 
rent economic reforms and FDI concentration have a consistent pos- 
itive impact on the national economy, this would imply that the coun- 
try should continue to pursue similar policies in the future, and vice 
versa. 
 
2. The Case of Bulgaria 
Although Bulgaria is the poorest of the EU-27 member states today, 
the low GDP base has allowed for robust real GDP growth rates be- 
2 Source: Bulgarian National Bank and InvestBulgaria, 2008 
3 Bulgaria suffered a deep crisis in the banking sector in 1996-7. 
For more, see: Roussenova, L. (2002): The 1996-1997 Financial Crisis in Bulgaria, 
Policy Documentation Centre 




tween 2000 and 20084. This coincided with the period of Bulgaria’s 
EU accession negotiations and membership. As a cumulative result 
of (1) projected GDP growth rates, (2) the lack of exposure to the 
direct impact of the defaulting market instruments, and (3) path-de- 
pendence where a new member’s EU accession is usually followed 
on by a period of strong economic growth5, the overall economic 
contraction in 2009 and 2010 for Bulgaria was first projected at 
lower rates than in many EU member states6. However, in the event, 
this projection was erroneous as much of the slowdown in Bulgaria 
was accounted for by a contraction in industry, construction in the 
main7. This harmed productive capital investment in the economy 
which is generally considered to be the main drive of economic re- 
structuring and technology diffusion8. 
In Bulgaria, a substantial part of capital investment is accrued from 
FDI inflows. This is due to the fact that the Bulgarian economy is much 
more heavily reliant on FDI capital-inflows than other CEECs, which com- 
prise 9.9% of GDP per annum and rising9. Comparatively, the average 
share of FDI in GDP in the remainder of the CEECs is 3.7%10. The gap 
is significant, in the first instance reflecting the smaller GDP of Bulgaria 
as compared to that of other CEECs. The disparity between Bulgaria 
and the rest of the CEECs also highlights the greater difficulty that the 
state will experience in adjusting to a sharp withdrawal of FDI inflows11. 
 
4 Source: Eurostat, 2009 (Real GDP growth in Bulgaria in 2008 was one of the highest 
amongst the EU members states, behind only Romania and Slovakia) 
5 Buch, C. and Piazolo, D. (2001): Capital and trade flows in Europe and the impact of 
enlargement, Economic Systems, Vol. 25, Issue 3, pp. 183-214, Elsevier Science B.V. 
6 Ibid. 
7   Anti-crisis Plan of the Confederation of Employers and Industrialists in Bulgaria, 2009 
8 FDI and Productivity Convergence in Central and Eastern Europe: An Industry Level 
Investigation, European Central Bank, Working Paper Series No. 992/ January 2009, p. 5 
9 Source: Ministry of the Economy and Energy of the Republic of Bulgaria, Investment 
Policy Directorate, 2005. FDI in 2007 was 22.6% of GDP and in 2008, 16% of GDP 
according to data of the Bulgarian National Bank. 
10 Ibid. 
11 FDI in 2009 is anticipated to contract to ca. 7% of GDP, compared to 16% of GDP 
in 2008. (Source: Ministry of the Economy of Bulgaria) 




The initial forecast of Eurostat was for a more measured con- 
traction of the Bulgarian economy over the period 2009-2010 than 
occurred in reality12. Thus, the incidence of two factors in particu- 
lar makes Bulgaria a singularly interesting case to investigate 
amongst the CEECs: on the one hand, Bulgaria was not exposed to 
the defaulting market instruments, and yet, on the other hand, it un- 
derwent prolonged economic slowdown. Whereas in the majority of 
CEECs the incidence of the latter can be explained through the pres- 
ence of the former (Hungary), this is not the case of Bulgaria. 
This article suggests that the disparity in real growth outlook be- 
tween Bulgaria and the majority of the CEECs is on account of three 
factors in the main: (1) an overreliance of the national economy on FDI; 
(2) a large volume of speculative investments in the total FDI stock mix 
which failed to generate significant absorptive capacities in the coun- 
try’s industrial base; and (3) a faster rate of withdrawal of FDI inflows 
from the country in 2009 than first anticipated, which led central and 
regional government to introduce an array of taxes in order to finance 
the looming budgetary deficit, thus further restricting economic activ- 
ity. Fiscal austerity, thus, settled in without any forewarning, severely 
affecting economic predictability and business confidence. 
This article does not propose a grand design theory behind Bul- 
garia’s misshaped development. Instead, the focus is squarely on 
FDI in the main, as one explanation amongst others for Bulgaria’s 
weak industrial outlook and development. In turn, FDI is differenti- 
ated between speculative and non-speculative (strategic). Specula- 
tive investments are considered to be short-term financial flows 
which can threaten market liquidity13. Non-speculative investments 
are strategic interest strategies, which also often pursue a set of long 
term policies and procedures. A distinction between speculative and 
non-speculative capital flows is sometimes further drawn in the lit- 
 
12 Eurostat, Real GDP Growth Rate, 2000-2011 
13 Deacon, B. (2000): Eastern European welfare states: the impact of the politics of 
globalization, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 146-161 




erature along a differential between ‘non-productive’ and ‘produc- 
tive’ investments14. The majority investments in Bulgaria were in the 
service and property sectors. They did not target developing pro- 
duction capacity in industry. Export capacity development was thus 
weak while imports increased rapidly in the first millennial decade 
as a result of accelerated domestic demand15. Bulgaria’s FDI spread 
has allowed for an accelerated rate of FDI (and remittances16) with- 
drawals from the national economy. 
 
3. Industrial Restructuring 
Since transition began in 1990, the industrial sector has progressively 
shrunk vis-à-vis the services sector as share of the national economy, 
a trend observed in the developed world since the 1970s17. Thus, 
whereas in 1991 industry represented 42.8% of GVA18 with services 
at 43%19, by 2007 industry formed 32.3% of GVA while services ac- 
counted for 61.5%20. Although this may seem symptomatic of a pro- 
found reorientation of economic activity, it is important to note that 
the declining share of industry within the national economy was in 
large part accounted for by a degree of freefall, resulting from the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the COMECON, the principal ex- 
port destinations for Bulgarian industrial goods. In addition, inefficient 
and aged state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that were viable only 
within the context of intra-COMECON country trade specialisation pre- 
1989, added to the burden on industry to restructure post-1990. 
Notwithstanding, this was further compounded by a comparatively 
14 Salvatore, D. (2006): Currency Misalignments and Trade Asymmetries among Major 
Economic Areas, pp. 1-19, in Alexander, V. and Kotz, H.-H. (eds.): Global Divergence 
in Trade, Money and Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing 
15 National Statistical Institute, Bulgaria: annualised data sheets, www.nsi.bg 
16 In 2003, remittances composed 49.64% of FDI (Source: Krassen Stanchev, Institute 
for Market Economics, Sofia) 
17 Industrial Metamorphosis, The Economist, 29/09/2005 
18 GVA represents GDP minus adjustments, which are the financial intermediation services 
indirectly measured, non-deductible value-added tax, excises and import duties. 
19 National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, 1999 
20 AEE, 2005; InvestBulgaria Agency, 2009 




slow pace of privatization and the involvement of insiders who failed 
to incentivise the process sufficiently. 
Industrial restructuring reform post-1990 has been driven in the 
first instance by the process of European integration. 
The empirical findings suggest that the overall direct effect of the 
pre-accession instruments on the national economy is negligible. It 
finances 6-7% of the cost of Bulgaria’s preparation for accession21. 
Furthermore, the impact on the fiscal position of the state is believed 
to be negative22. The absorption capacity both at central government 
and at local government (municipal) level has remained highly prob- 
lematic23. For instance financial absorption under the Programme 
INTERREG IIIA / PHARE CBC Greece-Bulgaria was 7.12% by the end 
of 2003 due to implementation, approval and recruitment delays24. 
In consequence, the most highly prized contribution of the pre- 
accession facilities to the economic transformation of Bulgaria is in- 
direct. It lies in the credibility that they afforded the country as a 
prospective EU member state with the associated political stability 
and economic prosperity that the European integration process lends 
the accession-candidate. It is this indirect impact that has allowed 
the Balkan state to attract substantial FDI inflows as percentage of 
GDP over the past decade. By 2006, 22% of FDI stock in Bulgaria 
had gone to the industrial sector25. Thus, Foreign Direct Investment 
has had the most singularly significant external advantageous im- 
pact on the development of the national economy as a major source 
of liquid capital flow for second-generation industrial reforms that 
ensued following the initial privatisation offering of SOEs. 
 
21 Angelov, I. (2001): Positive and Negative Effects from the Integration of Bulgaria to 
the European Union, Economic Thought, Issue 4, pp. 24-61 
22 This article: Table 7, p. 16 
23 Operational Programme Technical Assistance 2007-2013, Republic of Bulgaria, Ministry 
of Finance, November 2007, p. 7-ff. 
24 ΑΞΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΗ Π.Κ.Π. INTERREG IIIA/PHARE CBC ΕΛΛΑ∆Α-ΒΟΥΛΓΑΡΙΑ, ΕΕΟ GROUP Α.Ε.- 
GLOBAL VIEW A.E. 
25 Bulgaria Factsheet 2006: Economy Investment, Business and Industry, InvestBulgaria 
Agency, 2006 




In turn, these investments are differentiated between speculative 
and non-speculative in order to distinguish between the short- and 
the long-term impact of FDI on the economy. In the break-down the 
article points to the significance of regional FDI that emerges from 
the analysis. In the case of Bulgaria, regional FDI is provided for by 
Greek capital inflows in the main. This incidence is both historical 
and logical in that regional trade can lead not only to bilateral but 
also to multilateral agreements26. It was only due to the fundamental 
difference of system values during the pre-transition period that this 
event never occurred prior to 1990 in South-East Europe, leaving 
the region divided and weak for many decades. Proving the im- 
portance of regional co-operation, FDI in Bulgaria originating from 
Greece was the most significant single source of FDI flows to the 
country in the years 1996-200327. Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and 
others followed on by some distance during this period28. It was only 
by the time that Bulgaria’s EU membership looked increasingly cer- 
tain that the primacy of Greece as geographic origin of FDI was grad- 
ually overtaken by the larger economies of Austria and the Nether- 
lands. Greek FDI remained the overall second strongest source of 
foreign investments in the country in 200429, which also coincided 
with a period of robust GDP growth in Bulgaria30. Overall, during the 
period 1996-2008, FDI stock originating in Greece represented 9% 
of total investment inflows, making it the third largest source of FDI 
after the larger economies of Austria (16%) and the Netherlands 
(12%)31. 
 
26 This incidence is not novel within the wider European context: note the relationship 
between Sweden and the Baltic region; Germany/Austria and the Central European 
region, etc. See also: Blomström, M., Kokko, A. and Globerman, S. (1998): Regional 
Economic Integration and Foreign Direct Investment: The North American Experience, 
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 269 
27 Source: Bulgarian National Bank and InvestBulgaria, 2009 
28 Ibid. 
29 Source: www.bulgarianindustry.bg (site last accessed 17/08/2009) 
30 Bulgarian National Bank, 2009 
31 InvestBulgaria Agency, 2009 
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4. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
4.1 FDI and Economic Development 
FDI is invariably described as having a positive effect on the eco- 
nomic transition of states in the area of technology transfer for ca- 
pacity development in the industrial sector32. The impact of FDI on 
the host economy can be recognised in any one of three ways: (1) 
by stimulating development in the country through GDP growth, ex- 
port capacity growth and capital stock growth; (2) by improving the 
technical and know-how transfer in the host country; (3) by devel- 
oping the infrastructure that is consistent with environmental stan- 
dards33. There are countries within CEE, which attracted FDI already 
in the first decade of transition, whilst others achieved this only in 
the second decade. Different assessments of the impact of ‘early’ 
and ‘late’ FDI on productive assets exist. 
The proponents of the former have based their arguments 
around early observations of FDI flows to CEE34. They have noted that 
those were very much focused on the Czech Republic and Hungary 
and much less so on the remainder of the CEECs. Against this back- 
ground and given the already noted negligible direct effect of cap- 
ital flows from the pre-accession financial facilities as compared to 
the demands of transition, their observation stands. However, they 
make further mention of determinants on FDI that contribute to a 
disparate concentration of investments across countries and regions. 
Scholars have noted the role of geography, the size of GDP and in- 
flation, all of which have influenced the choice of destination for in- 
vestors35. Bulgaria falls in Europe’s geographic periphery, has low 
 
32 Campos, N. and Konishita, Y. (2002): Foreign Direct Investment as Technology 
Transferred: Some Panel Evidence from the Transition Economies, William Davidson 
Institute Working Paper Number 438 
33 Grigorova, V. (2007): FDI in Industry in Bulgaria, BAS, Sofia, p. 29 
34 Lankes, H-P. and Venables, A.J. (1996): Foreign Direct Investment in Economic 
Transition: the changing patterns of investments, Economics of Transition, Vol. 4 (2), 
pp. 331-347 
35    Ibid., p. 334 




GDP and in the early years of the transition, had considerable in- 
flation that was not reversed until as late as 1998 (Table 1). The 
EBRD transition report of 1995 notes that Bulgaria ranks only 
ahead of Romania in terms of how advanced its transition is with 
2.56 out of maximum 4 points (which many foreign investors inci- 
dentally correlate with risk assessment), and this index is likewise 
reflected in its attractiveness to investors. 
 
TABLE 1: Main economic indicators of Bulgaria, 2000-2005 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP growth, % 5.4 4.1 4.9 4.5 5.6 5.5 
Industrial output growth, % 4.6 2.2 4.6 15.0 18.1 16.4 
Inflation, % 10.3 7.4 5.8 2.3 4.1 6.5 
Exports (bn EUR) 5.3 5.7 6.1 6.7 8.0 9.5 
Imports (bn EUR) 7.1 8.1 8.4 9.6 11.6 14.7 
Source: Grigorova, V. (2007): FDI in Industry in Bulgaria, BAS, Sofia, p. 64 
 
A study by Iammarino and Pitelis on Greek FDI in Bulgaria and 
Romania explains the incidence of its concentration in the two 
Balkan states as flows from a peripheral EU economy to less 
favoured regions (LFRs)36. The evidence focuses on the effect of in- 
vestments both for the host/home country analysis, as well as the 
effect for the EU integration of LFRs and conversely the impact of 
those on the state of the Union. A unifying feature that the authors 
identify between Greece, Bulgaria and Romania is the fact that they 
all befit the category of EU LFRs. 
Yet, this explanation alone appears deficient. Total volumes of 
Greek FDI to the growth markets in South-East Europe indicate that 
it is a far more sophisticated economy than Bulgaria and Romania37. 
 
36 Iammarino, S and Pitelis, C. (1999): Foreign Direct Investment and Less Favoured 
Regions: Greek FDI in Bulgaria and Romania, ERSA Conference Paper Aug. 1999 
37 Stoian, C. and Filippaios, F. (2008): Foreign Direct Investment in Central, Eastern and 
South Eastern Europe: an 'eclectic' approach to Greek investments, International Journal 
of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 542-564, p. 553 




Thus, Greek companies could have chosen as investment destina- 
tion any of the other CEE growth markets. Moreover, Greek FDI flows 
to Turkey and the Western Balkans are also significant over the same 
period, yet those countries were not yet EU accession candidates. 
Adding to the Iammarino and Pitelis centre-periphery explanation, 
this paper proposes the formation of stronger intra-regional ties 
within traditional regional trade blocks38. 
The idea of regional trade blocks is not an idea instead of mul- 
tilateralism but rather, post-1990, an idea in addition to multilater- 
alism, so that we have both multilateral trade agreements (GATT) but 
also preferential trade agreements (EU). Within regions of prefer- 
ential trade agreements we also observe the gradual formation of 
regional centres or ‘neighbourhoods’ based on the effectiveness and 
utility of bilateral trade relations. In effect, we observe a three-tier 
trade system made of (1) multilateral agreements, (2) regional trad- 
ing blocks and (3) regional trading neighbourhoods39. The stronger 
dynamic of trade between Greece and Bulgaria, as well as between 
Greece and other of the states in SEE, such as Romania, Turkey and 
the Western Balkans, as opposed to the CEE region is better ex- 
plained from this perspective than from the strict perspective of a 
centre-periphery hypothesis alone. In turn, it should seem logical that 
for non-EU members that are also transition economies, such as Bul- 
garia in 1990, regional FDI from neighbouring states should be 
more significant in the first instances. At a second stage FDI from 
the wider regional trading block and from multilateral partners is at- 
tracted. This explains why in the case of Bulgaria the largest volume 
of FDI in the pre-accession period has come from Greek investors 
(1996-2003)40. This was followed on by a substantial additional in- 
vestment from the EU more generally as accession negotiations pro- 
 
38 Reardon, J., Kling, N., McCorkle, J.E. and Miller, C. (2002): The formation of regional 
trade blocks: A theoretical perspective using game theory, American Business Review, 
Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 91-99 
39 Also supported by the Inter-Balkan Cooperation, the BSECO and the Tripartite Initiative. 
40 Cr.-ref. section I, p. 6-ff., this article 




gressed significantly (2003-2008) and was complemented by FDI 
from ROW as the certainty of accession increased (2004-2008). All 
along, the immediate regional FDI effect has not lost its significance, 
continuing to aid in the industrial restructuring and general eco- 
nomic development of the host country41. 
 
4.2 Greek FDI in Bulgaria 
A number of benefits accrue to the host state from FDI. A firm em- 
bodies labour, capital, technology, and accumulated management 
expertise and marketing skills, and when it invests abroad, it trans- 
fers many of these components to its affiliate. Another benefit is set 
in the ability of an enterprise to channel its various outputs in the 
host country through its affiliate network, impacting positively on the 
host country’s trade balance albeit this effect is differentiated ac- 
cording to the type of FDI42. In this way, the goods produced in the 
host country are distributed to markets elsewhere. 
In addition to such obvious advantages FDI has a ‘dynamic’ com- 
ponent. This arises from the international rivalry of firms: ‘The entry 
of a foreign investor into a market can pose a competitive challenge 
to local firms or to existing investors. For firms producing goods and 
services which cannot be traded internationally owing to their intan- 
gibility or prohibitive transport costs, FDI is the only mechanism for 
international competition.’43 This is an assessment particularly true of 
economies in transition that have not yet been partly or fully integrated 
into a regional trade block. Then, FDI from a neighbouring state, that 
is however already fully integrated and operates a more sophisticated 
economy, can provide such much needed transfers and channels of 
affiliate networks to help in the restructuring and thereby, the inte- 
gration of the host country by creating absorptive capacities. 
 
41 Monastiriotis, V. (2008): Quo Vadis Southeast Europe? EU Accession, Regional Coop- 
eration and the need for a Balkan Development Strategy, GreeSE Paper Series, No. 10 
42 Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Development: Lessons from Six Emerging 
Economies, OECD, 1998, p. 53-ff. 
43 Ibid. 




If we compare the results in Figure 1 and 2, we can see that 
there is a clear correlation between GDP growth and FDI flows. GDP 
growth is accompanied by surges in FDI and conversely, GDP con- 
traction is accompanied by a withdrawal of FDI. There are more 
many factors that contribute to both events but since this study only 










Source: Eurostat, 2009; IMF, 2009 
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looks at the structure of GDP as related to FDI, the analysis is con- 
strained within those parameters. 
If we look at industry within the structure of GDP, then Table 2 
shows that during the pre-accession period the bulk of FDI flows tar- 
geted the industrial sector, followed on by telecommunications and 
finance, whilst the construction sector attracted far less attention 
from investors. 
 
TABLE 2: Distribution of FDI by sectors of the economy, 1992-199744 
Sector of the economy Number of deals FDI, % of GDP 
Industry 499 47.84 
Construction 97 1.25 
Transport 157 6.71 
Telecommunications 19 18.6 
Trade 45 7.36 
Tourism 45 7.36 
Finance 146 12.75 









Agriculture Services Industry 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Bulgaria 
 
44 Jordanova, Z. T. (1999): FDI in Bulgaria: The basis for the formation of strategic alliances 
of the type ‘East-West’ in the process of preparation of joining the EU, Economics and 
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After the start of EU accession negotiations in 1999, manufac- 
turing continued to receive strong attention but this was on par with 
finance, whereas the construction sector picked up quickly. Invest- 
ments in real estate took a precedent. Comparing the evidence in 
Table 2 and Figure 3, industry emerges as one of the most dynamic 
sectors post-2000 in terms of FDI interest. 
Table 3 evidences an investment sector break-down in 1998- 
2005. It shows that investments in industry have increased three- 
fold. A significant part of the increase is accounted for by manu- 
facturing and the construction sector. 
 
TABLE 3: Structure of investments in Bulgaria, 
1998-2005, million BGN45 
Sector/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Industry 1530.2 1929.9 2322.7 2599.5 2949.3 3638.9 4059.9 4255.0 
Mining 109.6 120.1 115.6 103.2 115.1 119.7 157.2 287.9 
Manufacturing 919.0 876.7 1290.6 1549.3 1921.0 2004.1 2086.4 2186.9 
Electricity, gas 

















Construction 241.6 317.8 343.1 419.3 409.9 490.8 762.6 861.6 
Agriculture 107.0 103.1 110.8 146.3 204.8 267.5 376.3 309.1 
Services 1751.0 2061.7 2976.0 3948.5 4066.4 4596.7 5513.4 5831.3 
Total 3388.2 4094.7 5409.4 6694.3 7220.5 8503.1 9949.6 10395.4 
Source: National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria / Grigorova, V. (2007): FDI in 
Industry in Bulgaria, Sofia, BAS, p. 78 
 
A correlation emerges, in that the greater the number of long- 
term non-speculative investments, the stronger the foundations of 
productive assets in the national economy. In turn, it enhances the 
ability of the state to generate absorptive capacities. A measure of 
this is often the rate of labour productivity growth as correlation of 
value added in the national economy per annum and the rate of em- 
 
45 1 Euro=1.95583 BGN (fixed) 
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FIGURE 4: Structure of investments in Bulgaria, 
 
 
ployment46. Table 4 shows that during the same reference period 
of 1998-2005, labour productivity growth in Bulgaria was modest 
while remaining the lowest amongst the CEECs. 
 
TABLE 4: Labour productivity, CEE region, by country, 
1998-2005 (EU-25=100) 
Year / Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Bulgaria 28.5 29.5 31.3 32.5 32.5 31.9 31.9 32.7 
Poland 46.2 49.1 51.3 50.3 51.5 59.6 62.0 61.9 
Romania 28.0 28.8 27.9 29.8 32.0 34.0 36.3 37.1 
Slovakia 50.2 51.8 54.5 55.9 58.9 58.9 60.3 61.9 
Slovenia 68.2 70.1 69.7 71.2 70.9 72.4 75.1 76.6 
Hungary 59.6 59.4 60.5 64.1 66.6 66.8 68.1 70.1 
Czech Republic 56.0 58.5 58.5 59.6 59.9 62.0 64.3 68.6 
Source: Eurostat, 2007 
 
Table 4 suggests that neither the size of the pre-accession fi- 
nancial facilities, nor the concentration of FDI by sector created suf- 
ficient absorption capacities in the national economy. Figure 4 and 
Figure 5 further suggest that the majority investments and FDI in- 












46 FDI and Productivity Convergence in Central and Eastern Europe: An Industry Level 
Investigation, European Central Bank, Working Paper Series No. 992/ January 2009, p. 6 










cumstance for short-term speculative investments in the host econ- 
omy in the main. 
The increase in investments is in large part accounted for by an 
increase in FDI flows. Approximately two-thirds of total FDI inflows 
were in the services sector of the national economy, as it is con- 
sidered more lucrative with a higher and faster rate of return on in- 
vestment. The remaining one-third of FDI inflows were concentrated 
primarily in the industrial sector, mainly in manufacturing and the 
construction sector. This distinction draws on an anticipated effect 
of investments for the host economy at large. Speculative investments 
are related to short-term capital flows. In certain cases, they have 
even the potential to be harmful to the economy, such as under cir- 
cumstances of a global financial crisis with restricted bank lending. 
Non-speculative investments relate to long-term investment com- 
mitments that usually bear some strategic characteristics, such as 
in the manufacturing industry, construction, and the banking sec- 
tor et al. 
 
  FIGURE 5: Structure of FDI flows in Bulgaria,  










Source: Grigorova, V. (2007): FDI in Industry in Bulgaria, Sofia, BAS, p. 100 
 
Within the discussion of long-term non-speculative investments 
in the Bulgarian economy, the role of Greek FDI is important. 
Greece was the main country of FDI origin for the host economy in 










Bulgaria over the period 1996-2008 with a 9.3%47 of total FDI stock 
share while in some sectors, such as banking, this is rising to over 
23% of FDI stock48. 
    TABLE 5: Greek FDI flows in Bulgaria, EUR million, 1998-2008     
 
Year MEUR Increase y/y, MEUR 
1998 22.7 - 
1999 2.3 -20.4 
2000 105.8 103.5 
2001 262.3 156.5 
2002 240.1 -22.2 
2003 198.9 -41.2 
2004 179.6 -19.3 
2005 324.2 145 
2006 533.7 209.5 
2007 801.1 267.4 
2008 392.3 408.8 
Total 3063.0  
Amongst the long-term Greek FDI are investments in steelworks 
and other non-ferrous metals by Sidenor SA/Viohalco SA for Stom- 
ana Industries SA and Steelmet AD, respectively (7.32% of total 
Greek FDI). OTE/Globul and Intracom Holdings are strategic in- 
vestors in the telecommunications market with a share of some 48% 
of total FDI stock (43.27% of total Greek FDI stock). Other large non- 
speculative investments in light and heavy industry include Delta 
Dairy, Chipita, Coca-Cola HBC Bulgaria, Best Foods (food and bev- 
erages, 7% of total Greek FDI stock), Thrace paper mill (other pro- 
cessing, 7% of total Greek FDI stock), the Public Corporation of 
Greece (coal and mining), Titan SA (cement). A spread of FDI stock 
by sectors is shown in Figure 6. 
 
47 United Bulgarian Bank, National Bank of Greece Group (2007) 
48 Invest in Greece Agency 











  FIGURE 6: Structure of Greek FDI stock in Bulgaria,  












Figure 6 shows that almost two-thirds of total FDI stock is for long- 
term non-speculative, non-service sector investments, creating sig- 
nificant export capacities in the host country. Data from the bilat- 
eral trade turn-over further supports this claim. Greece has become 
Bulgaria’s third-largest trading partner, whilst Bulgaria, the fourth- 
largest trading partner of Greece49. In 2006, 6.9% of total Greek ex- 
ports went to Bulgaria (up from 6.3% in 2004). Imports from Bul- 
garia represented 1.6% of total Greek imports. Conversely, imports 
from Greece represented 4.9% of total imports (down from 5.7% in 
2004) while exports to Greece represented 8.9% of total exports. 
These indices have continued to rise through to 2008. A possible 
external explanation for this (in addition to domestic policy-making 
devised to attract FDI) is the creation of export capacity through FDI 
in the host country’s industrial sector. Over the period 1998-2008, 
of total EUR 3063 million of Greek FDI stock to Bulgaria, it is esti- 
mated that ca. 66% were made in industry (including telecommu- 
nications, or 25% excluding telecommunications)50. This is equiva- 
lent to some EUR 2083 million in total or EUR 766 million (excluding 
telecoms) in net FDI flows to the host country for long-term capital 
investments. 
 
49 Bulgarian Statistical Institute 
50 United Bulgarian Bank, National Bank of Greece Group 




This article discusses the dynamic between Bulgaria’s Euro- 
peanization and foreign direct investment, and the extent to which 
these parallel processes have aided in the economic transition of the 
country. It takes into consideration in turn the impact of financial 
instruments driven by the EU pre-accession financial facilities, 
namely PHARE, the Europe Agreements and Phare, and the influ- 
ence of what is considered the indirect impact of the EU accession 
process, foreign direct investment. 
The analysis suggests a general causal relationship between Eu- 
ropean integration and FDI whereby the latter can be seen as in- 
centivised by the progress of the former in a candidate state. The 
analysis also points to qualifications of this pattern. The incidence 
of Greek FDI in Bulgaria has followed both a European integration 
logic but also, critically, a logic of regional trade and cooperation, 
whereas the latter is preceeding the former and as soon as growth 
opportunities arise in the transition/host economy. 
The direct effect of accession negotiations is negligible. The 
indirect effect of the accession process, seen as total volumes 
of FDI stock in the host country, has been more significant. How- 
ever, spread across sectors of the economy, FDI to the industrial 
sector in Bulgaria has received much less attention than the serv- 
ices, prepondent amongst them, real estate and financial inter- 
mediation. 
Notwithstanding the overall impact of FDI for economic progress 
in Bulgaria, Greek FDI has proven a significant source of non-spec- 
ulative investment. Nearly two-thirds of the Greek FDI stock mix com- 
prises long-term investments in industry. This is differentiated 
from the general FDI stock pattern in Bulgaria where over 64% of 
investments have been effected in services. In turn, regional trade 
between Bulgaria and Greece recorded historical heights. Impor- 
tantly, the host country’s export trade volumes vis-à-vis the invest- 
ments’ geographic origin has grown in direct correlation. This had 
practical implications for the European integration of Bulgaria. With 




the advent of EU accession in 2007, South-East Europe generated 
renewed interest as a potential growth market, indicating a gen- 
erally positive impact of the process of European integration. How- 
ever, the present prolonged financial-cum-economic crisis has 
aptly emphasised the pre-eminent importance of non-speculative 
FDI in the host economy, and possibly even more so in growth and 
opportunity markets, exposing the vacuum (fiscal austerity) in 
non-defaulting transition economies under pressure from fast spec- 
ulative FDI withdrawals. This, in turn, requires a renewed discourse 
on the role of the state in the economy, not so much for regulation 
but for compliance, and the omnipresence of ‘moral’ hazard in eco- 
nomic restructuring, especially in weak transition states with little 
absorptive capacity, high incidence of perceived corruption and 
state capture by elites. 
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The findings of this paper are the results of original research that 
was conducted whilst at the Hellenic Observatory, LSE in 2009- 
2010. The current crisis that began in 2008 has challenged some 
of the core tenets of fiscal policymaking in Greece and elsewhere. 
Conventional tools and methods of budgeting and decision making 
can no longer achieve the desired fiscal targets and fall short of 
meeting citizens expectations. This paper examines a possible 
reengineering of budget processes, as part of the macroeconomic 
toolkit that could address long-term fiscal sustainability. 
Keywords: Fiscal governance, crisis budgeting, public expendi- 
ture, fiscal discipline, fiscal policymaking. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent economic crisis has brought up renewed concerns 
over the problems and dysfunctionalities that have existed in pub- 
lic financial systems for a long time. Many countries, and especially 
Greece, face daunting fiscal challenges that imperil the sustainability 
of public finances and call for immediate and drastic measures in 
order to face the current budget predicament. 
However, breaking with the past and recasting the budget 
process in terms of efficiency and transparency is not an easy 
task. It requires a radical reorientation of budgeting and spend- 
ing patterns in general. The transition from an incremental to a 
decremental concept of fiscal policymaking with a view to facili- 
tating the maneuverability of the government and to expanding 
freedom of action is of key importance. Early on, Tarschys (1981) 
argued that decelerating growth or post-expansive stagnation re- 
quires not only a range of new and unpleasant decisions, but also 
institutional change. Only through systemic change and a com- 
plete revamping of methods, tools and strategies may we envis- 
age boosting the innovative potential of the economy in a time of 
scarcity. 
However, coming to terms with decremental reasoning in budg- 
eting is only one aspect of proactive fiscal governance. Successful 
fiscal policymaking, though, is not reflected only in how deeply a 
country can cut into its fiscal deficit, but in how capable it is to pre- 
vent it (Marcel and Tokman, 2002). Thus a country’s given fiscal sys- 
tem proves its efficiency during good times, when the economy is 
rising and enough fiscal leeway is maintained for investment pri- 
orities, such as infrastructure, research and development and ed- 
ucation. At a time when the costs of ageing and debt service rep- 
resent a high percentage of budget expenditure in many countries, 




it is necessary to regain enough space for fiscal policy1 and to cre- 
ate a financial buffer for fiscal challenges (Steger, 2013). 
In the light of the above, and given the current fiscal predicament 
in Greece, it is of key importance for the country to restore growth 
momentum and to rebalance existing fiscal pressures. This can be 
achieved through improved coordination and tighter linkages be- 
tween past fiscal legacies and future fiscal prospects. To this end, 
a comprehensive review of the current budget framework in Greece 
should be undertaken with a view to reorienting fiscal policymaking 
more towards the future, while acknowledging today’s taxpayers’ 
needs. 
However, in order for Greece to improve future fiscal prospects 
and to regain credibility in fiscal policymaking, a more transparent 
and open approach to budgeting would have to be adopted. In 
Greece most notably, but also elsewhere, reported debts and deficits 
before the crisis turned out to be poor indicators of the underlying 
health of public finances (Min Zhu, 2013). Therefore, in order to im- 
prove the quality of information available to decision makers as well 
as to provide more reliable data for future fiscal developments, a re- 
vitalized fiscal transparency effort would have to be envisaged. 
Enhancing transparency in terms of disclosure of information 
should nevertheless be coupled with disclosure in terms of acces- 
sibility and relevance of data to citizens. After all, fiscal policy is also 
about creating results for citizens, even in a fiscally constrained en- 
vironment. The expected results, as expressed in the design and im- 
plementation of various public policies, cannot remain mere input 
figures. On the contrary, budgeting should be steered more towards 
efficiency and performance. 
This paper is based on previous research findings (Vraniali, 
2010) and aims to assess public financial management practices 
 
1 With the term fiscal space we refer to all resources that become available either 
through reallocation or are generated by economic growth or an increase in tax 
revenue (Schick, 2009). 




in Greece with a view to addressing current fiscal challenges as well 
as to improving the quality of fiscal policymaking through a reengi- 
neering of budget processes throughout the budget cycle. 
It should be noted that the research conducted at the LSE led 
to an international fiscal conference held at LSE premises, which fo- 
cused on “Public Financial Management in Times of Crisis: Fiscal 
Realities and Management Challenges in Greece and the EU”2. The 
conference was convened by the author and co-organized by the Hel- 
lenic Observatory, LSE and a French think-tank, FONDAFIP, of which 
the author is a member and a program officer. The conference pro- 
vided a forum for academics, practitioners, policy makers of Greece 
and other countries as well as the general public to discuss various 
fiscal issues and to make recommendations for the future. 
 
2. Adjusting and refining budget processes 
towards a sustainable path 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the question of fiscal 
sustainability has received special attention. To this end, much in- 
terest has been attached internationally to policy reforms that inte- 
grate assumptions about the future in a more dynamic manner. Ac- 
cording to Tanner (2013), a “sustainable fiscal policy” may be one 
that, if continued indefinitely and without modification, would keep 
the government solvent. A “policy” may be construed as either a pre- 
determined primary surplus or some constraining rule, stated ex- 
plicitly or implicitly. 
Concerns about the sustainability3 of Greek public finances have 




3 According to Schick (2005), sustainability should be examined through four different 
dimensions: a. solvency: the ability of government to pay its financial obligations, 
b. growth: fiscal policy that sustains economic growth, c. stability: the capacity of gov- 
ernment to meet future obligations with existing tax burdens and d. fairness: the capacity 
of government to pay current obligations without shifting the cost to future generations. 




try as well as the need to shift the focus of policymaking to a more 
responsible and forward-looking approach. However, fiscal sustain- 
ability issues have not surfaced only in order to satisfy proactive fis- 
cal information delivery purposes. Rather, the urgency of these pol- 
icy changes has arisen as a result of the inability of conventional tools 
and methods to address these long-term challenges (Schick, 2005). 
Many countries like New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom 
have taken pre-emptive measures and opted for a review of their fis- 
cal sustainability, as foreseen in their fiscal responsibility regimes, 
which were promulgated during the past decade. 
Adapting to this new environment requires, first of all, the es- 
tablishment of a solid foundation for budget design and imple- 
mentation on a yearly basis. In other words, the budget should be 
drafted on a sound macro-economic footing, including a realistic 
assessment of resources for the setting of relevant fiscal targets 
(Schiavo-Ciampo, 2007). However, recent budgeting practice in 
Greece has long been criticized (IMF, 2006; OECD, 2008) for lack- 
ing non-governmental forecasting as well as for avoiding actual in- 
tegration of publicly available macro-economic forecasts into the 
budget process. Following the example of other countries like 
Canada and the Netherlands, who have proceeded with a more pru- 
dent way of fiscal policymaking through the use of a less optimistic 
forecasting scenario on which the budget is based and the incor- 
poration of a contingency reserve, Greece should also embark on 
such reforms. 
Once the budget has been set on solid foundations, attention 
should be paid to the definition of aggregate expenditure estimates 
consistent with the country’s medium-term fiscal framework. Al- 
though, in Greece, specific estimates pertaining mainly to deficit and 
debt have been put forward, as imposed at EU level, they have not 
yet been fully institutionalized and the budget process tends to fo- 
cus primarily on the current fiscal year. 
Many tools and techniques have been devised internationally to 
address all issues regarding the incorporation of future fiscal pro- 




jections in the budgeting process. These include, multi-year ex- 
penditure planning, the partial incorporation of long-term projections 
in the budgeting process and good expenditure prioritization. Re- 
garding the first, it can be stated that a majority of OECD countries 
have already engaged in the preparation of multi-year budgets4. As 
a general rule, multi-year budgets are rolled-over every year and usu- 
ally depict the current level of expenditure and additional expendi- 
ture to furnish the same or another service in the future. Nonethe- 
less, from the mid-1980s onwards, many countries, based on past 
experiences and failures, shifted the goal of multi-year budgeting 
from being a tool for identifying new programs to another one for 
constraining expenditure and improving the allocation of resources. 
So, even if this type of budgeting remains only a background doc- 
ument, it does not provide scope for new spending schemes as the 
existing ones have already claimed a substantial part of future re- 
sources, provided of course it is accompanied by strong political will 
to curb expenditure. 
Another commonly used technique, which enables governments 
to control more effectively aggregate spending and to maintain a 
multi-year perspective, is top-down budgeting. This specific tool can 
prove its significance especially in times of fiscal consolidation, as it 
is easier to integrate this type of budgeting with a medium-term ex- 
penditure framework (MTEF) and it also ensures that spending is 
aligned with policy priorities. In this vein, it should be noted that budg- 
eting during recessions becomes more centralized and top-down any- 
way because the urgency of the situation calls for immediate and ef- 
fective action, resulting in enhanced leadership from the Ministry of 
Finance, which tends to allocate specific resources as a basis for ne- 
gotiations (Steger, 2013). However, even in a non-constrained fiscal 
environment, top-down budgeting can bring significant added value 
to a forward-looking system of fiscal governance. 
 
4 In 1995, OECD listed Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, USA (OECD,1995) 




Finally, the high level of deficits and debt has sparked renewed 
interest in the use of fiscal rules5 as a permanent constraint on fis- 
cal policy (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). Proponents of fiscal rules 
claim that the main shortcoming of conventional budgeting lies in the 
fact that it is an open-ended process that provides fiscal room for ma- 
neuver and allows governments to accommodate spending de- 
mands, sometimes in excess of available public resources. In that 
sense, fiscal rules aim to counter this propensity by imposing spe- 
cific ceilings on taxation and spending policies that are not modified 
according to shifts in political orientation or the economic situation 
at any given time (Schick, 2003). 
However, these fiscal commitments are dependent upon the will- 
ingness of the politicians to comply with their terms and hence po- 
litical commitment is vital for their effectiveness; especially so in times 
of fiscal constraint. Paradoxically, though, one should acknowledge 
the fact that the effectiveness of these rules is also contingent upon 
their enforcement during good times, in so far as this is the time 
when governments tend to assume additional commitments in order 
to enhance social welfare. The poor state of public finances that en- 
sues from this fiscal behavior, as well as the recent crisis, have thus 
confirmed the need to review fiscal policy orientation not only dur- 
ing recessions but chiefly while the economy is booming and there 
is scope for the creation of fiscal space. 
 
3. Enhancing budget transparency 
Fiscal and economic crises also have an immense impact on the 
state and advancement of fiscal transparency. As Khagram S. et al 
(2013) point out, during recessions governments are forced to en- 
hance the mechanisms in place for fiscal discipline and independ- 
 
 
5 A fiscal rule is a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, binding not only the current 
government and parliament but also any renewed political composition of these 
institutions as well. It is also a concrete and quantifiable indicator of fiscal performance 
at a given time, which helps to assess sustainability of public finances (Ljungman, 2008). 




ent scrutiny, contributing thus, among other factors, to significant 
improvements in transparency and participation. The term fiscal 
transparency should be defined as the clarity, reliability, frequency, 
timeliness and relevance of public fiscal reporting as well as the 
openness to the public of the government’s fiscal policymaking 
process, which is a fundamental aspect of any public financial man- 
agement system (IMF, 2012). 
The purpose of maintaining a high level of fiscal transparency 
is threefold: firstly, policy decisions are more accurate and realis- 
tic, and tend to better reflect the costs and benefits of potential mod- 
ifications to the country’s fiscal course. Secondly, governments are 
held to account for their fiscal performance as well as for the cor- 
rect use and distribution of public resources on a more reliable ba- 
sis. Finally, international surveillance of a country’s fiscal stance is 
more easily conducted in order to prevent the propagation of fiscal 
shocks to other countries (IMF, 2012). 
In light of the above, and with a view to improving the quality of 
fiscal decision making in Greece as well as the credibility of rele- 
vant fiscal policies, the government needs to have in its possession 
reliable, comprehensive, timely and accurate data. Hence an opti- 
mization of the use of fiscal information in the budget process should 
be envisaged for Greece too. This would include a proliferation of 
publications regarding all aspects of public financial management 
and an improved use of general, and not only central, government 
expenditure and revenue figures, as a better indicator of a balanced 
fiscal system. 
In terms of comprehensiveness of information, additional data on 
the targets, outputs and expected outcomes of public policies 
should also be provided. The basic idea of budgeting should be very 
simple, fiscal information and decisions should be structured ac- 
cording to the objectives set out by government. In that direction, 
program budgeting has been used internationally as a tool of pol- 
icy analysis that facilitates comparison and evaluation of the cost- 
effectiveness of alternative spending options that have the same ob- 




jective, as well as a framework that enables decision makers to pri- 
oritize and determine spending options (World Bank, 2007). This 
reshuffling of budget classifications6, moving from an intensively de- 
tailed input orientation of the budget in Greece, which contained 
some 14,000 items (OECD, 2008) to a new budget nomenclature, 
would arguably dissipate efficiency and transparency concerns. 
In order for this system to perform effectively, an improved tool 
for the recording and exchange of financial data should be con- 
sidered, such as the use of an additional accounting system. To this 
end, the countries that have migrated to the use of accruals are qual- 
ified as pioneers in adopting fiscal reforms, and generally opt for 
this reorientation with a view to making the cost of government ac- 
tion and the impact of its commitments more transparent. Effective 
and efficient decision making in this context can be underpinned 
by holding managers responsible for outcomes or outputs and by 
reducing controls on inputs, provided however they have at their dis- 
posal comprehensive and accurate information with which to 
achieve this (Blondal, 2003). Contrary to this practice, accounting 
for the Greek budget is mainly on a cash basis, recording cash re- 
ceipts and payments, and is preferred for reasons of operational sim- 
plicity. In any case, the implementation of accruals should not be 
regarded as a pure technical maneuver but should rather be ac- 
companied by a relevant cultural change in budgeting in a way that 
the new information provided could be useful and conducive to en- 
hanced quality in fiscal decision making. 
Moreover, in an attempt to clear up the fiscal fog, special atten- 
tion should also be paid to harmonizing the relevant regulatory 
framework. In a culture of legalistic fiscal setting, as is the Greek 
one, a reinforcement of the relevant legal apparatus which under- 
pins budget processes should be examined. The establishment 
 
6 In practice, a program budgeting structure must be aligned to at least two classification 
schemes that both serve different purposes: the program classification and the 
organizational unit classification (World Bank, 2007) 




and integration of new principles of fiscal governance, such as the 
principle of stability, efficiency or sincerity (Sénat, 2006), comple- 
mentary to the conceptual framework of the Stability and Growth 
Pact at EU level, could undeniably provide the necessary national 
legal basis and interpretation of modern fiscal concepts7. 
In any case, governments need to proactively assist their citizens 
in understanding the budget and in elucidating their policy objec- 
tives in a way that facilitates public discourse. Access to information 
is a prerequisite for citizens to evaluate how a government is using 
its entrusted powers to tax, borrow, and spend public resources and 
to hold a government properly to account (Petrie and Shields, 
2010). Publication of a citizen’s budget is also foreseen by the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund in its Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency (2007), where it is described that fiscal information 
should be presented in a way that facilitates policy analysis and pro- 
motes accountability (IMF, 2007). 
In terms of informational sufficiency, further action has to be en- 
visaged in Greece in order to enhance effective public scrutiny 
throughout the budget process. The Constitutional revision of 2008 
reinforced the role of the relevant parliamentary Standing Commit- 
tee in the elaboration of the budget and provided for enhanced par- 
liamentary information on a monthly and quarterly basis. Never- 
theless, the objective of having an abundance of publications in 
order to fulfill the necessary reporting requirements is not yet met. 
 
4. Improving efficiency and control 
of the budgeting process 
Budgeting during a recession exhibits certain particularities due to 
the emergency of the situation and becomes inherently improvisa- 
tional. New tools and techniques are contrived to better absorb the 
needs of the moment, and frequent adjustments are adopted 
 
7 So far, the reform has been legally anchored in the current regulatory framework, 
as determined mainly in Law 2362/1995. 




throughout the budget cycle (Schick, 2009). In the same vein, 
Caiden and Wildavsky (1974) argued that in times of scarcity 
more budgets are drafted during the year. 
Therefore, enhancing fiscal discipline in times of economic tur- 
moil, although highly desirable, becomes a difficult task. In order to 
curb public deficit and debt, governments need to focus on the op- 
timization of rules and processes that govern the budget process as 
well as on the reinforcement of control procedures. 
Aligning the need to contain public expenditures with the aim of 
improving efficiency and integrating more prudence in public fi- 
nancial management has thus gained prominence. Commitment 
controls can play a significant role in imposing constraints on gov- 
ernment fiscal actions. They actually contribute to the determination 
of an overall expenditure limit and help avoid the accumulation of 
payment arrears, by setting a cap on commitments that decision 
makers can assume based on either budget appropriations or cash 
planning (Radev and Khemani, 2009). 
The current Greek practice, though, relies on the exercise of mul- 
tiple controls, which are foreseen after the commitment phase of ex- 
penditures, in a way that shifts the focus from restraining liabilities 
to containing cash payments. In light of the above and given that, 
in an attempt to stabilize public finances, several countries have been 
compelled to proceed to the institutionalization of such a system, cov- 
ering all types of expenditure, Greece could embrace such an ini- 
tiative too. 
Furthermore, another source of significant fiscal leakages that can 
hamper the execution of the budget is the use of tax expenditures. 
Although mandatory spending and tax expenditures are similar be- 
cause they function as open-ended entitlements and do not operate 
within the annual budget process, tax expenditures are more ap- 
pealing due to the fact that their costs are largely invisible to both 
policy makers and citizens (Burman and Phaup, 2011). As Bradford 
(2003) indicated, potentially any spending program could be trans- 
formed into tax expenditure in a way that both the budget and tax 




revenues would decline although the policy outcome would remain 
the same. The only change would appear in the accounting system. 
However, Greece has not yet embarked neither on a comprehensive 
review of their use nor on an evaluation of their growth. 
Another source of fiscal risk can also be detected in the man- 
agement of the wage bill, which constitutes in Greece one of the 
biggest fractions of public expenditures. A systematic and frequent 
update of all changes in personnel should be considered, in order 
to avoid fiscal leakages. The recent effort to conduct a census in 
Greece seems to be a step in the right direction. Most importantly, 
though, the establishment of relevant spending ceilings should also 
be considered, inasmuch as they impose a limit on over-commitment 
of personnel expenditure and can thus contribute to improved 
budget formulation (Allen and Tommasi, 2001). 
Examining budget efficiency goes necessarily along with a good 
and active cash management practice, which ensures the availability 
of a sufficient amount of funds for all government obligations in the 
most effective way (Storkey, 2003). In Greece, the cash manage- 
ment system is dominated by a control of cash payments for ex- 
penditure, without always providing for less predictable flows. In view 
of the high debt levels and the need to adjust cash management, 
expenditure commitments and debt management, it is advisable for 
Greece to improve coordination between revenue collecting agen- 
cies and the Treasury. However, in order to achieve a more agile 
budget management regime, policy makers in Greece should em- 
bark on a modernization of IT systems. Real-time integration of all 
relevant information can certainly enrich fiscal information and im- 
prove management processes. 
Moreover, the complexity of the aforementioned budget system, 
coupled with the need to realize efficiency gains, calls for a con- 
current review of accountability and control processes. The transi- 
tion to a new culture of fiscal governance inclined more towards per- 
formance and sustainability leads to a reorientation of control 
processes towards results and the evaluation of public policies. Bet- 




ter monitoring and control of public expenditure entails moving from 
ex ante to ex post controls with a parallel reinforcement of internal 
control. 
The conceptual footing underpinning this shift is defined in an 
improved linkage between effectiveness and compliance. In practice, 
it means trading the inefficient but relative certainty of checking the 
regularity and legality of individual transactions to the more efficient 
and relative uncertainty of verifying the proper operation of systems 
(Ruffner and Sevilla, 2004). In Greece, though, management and 
control processes have not yet adopted this orientation but embrace 
a thoroughly legalistic approach to monitoring and auditing of pub- 
lic expenditure, which does not necessarily align with the require- 
ments of a devolved and performance-oriented culture. This is re- 
flected in abundant and overlapping ex ante controls, whereas ex 
post audits focus mainly on the legality and regularity of procedures, 
without really assessing results. 
For this reason, a revision of the external audit regime should 
be envisaged, as the incorporation of evaluation and performance 
assessment in the auditing system is deemed necessary and con- 
sistent with international standards for external auditing (IMF, 
2006). At the same time, the government should consider acceler- 
ating the pace towards a tighter linkage between the Supreme Au- 
dit Institution and the legislature, an approach that many countries 
have adopted. 
In this regard, the Parliament’s oversight powers should be re- 
examined as well. Information scarcity, in terms of comprehen- 
siveness of fiscal data presented to the legislature, combined with 
significant time lags in the production and examination of fiscal in- 
formation concerning the previous budget year render the system 
less transparent and less effective (OECD, 2008). Meanwhile, in the 
last few years we have witnessed, at an international level, a rather 
dynamic positioning of the legislature in the budget process. In this 
perspective, Greece can benefit from the experience of others and 
integrate some of these elements in its external control system. 




Streamlining a budgeting system to accommodate fiscal realities and 
policy expectations is certainly a difficult exercise that requires a 
careful and calibrated combination of several aspects of fiscal gov- 
ernance. Furthermore, an amalgam of history, culture and values 
is likely to impede a smooth transition to a new system that renders 
obsolete the ideas and concepts that sustained and accompanied 
public financial management for a long period of time. 
Despite the initial momentum for reform, as dictated by fiscal 
tradeoffs, the desire to generate political consensus on the ambitious 
and extensive reforms needed has proven cumbersome. It actually 
involves harmonizing the rationality of policy analysis and fiscal gov- 
ernance with the rationality of politics. However, in order for a gov- 
ernment to adopt a successful dynamic adaptive behavior, virtually 
every significant feature of the system of government has to be re- 
viewed in some way (Scott, 2003). 
But, most of all, it involves aligning citizen expectations and gov- 
ernment financial capacity; or in other words, repairing the fiscal 
contract between citizens and the State. The current recession re- 
sulted in a major impairment of this contract in the most heavily af- 
fected countries, among which is Greece. As Schick (2011) points 
out, citizens have a large stake in their country’s fiscal contract, but 
they rarely have a direct voice in setting its terms. It should be noted, 
though, that it is not feasible for citizens to actively participate in the 
determination of fiscal aggregates. It is rather a combination of trust 
and stewardship that links citizens and government and enables the 
latter to chart its fiscal course. 
Restoring this relationship and rebuilding confidence in fiscal pol- 
icy entails setting out explicitly new terms in fiscal policymaking that 
better integrate performance and results in the budget process. To 
this end, a tighter linkage between resources allocated and results 
achieved can certainly contribute to harmonizing the desired out- 
comes with the actual ones. Schick (2011) points out that the ma- 
jority of performance-based budgets utilize this information without 




actually prescribing a clear and coherent connection between the 
two elements. Nevertheless, establishing a more performance-ori- 
ented budget requires a significant change in the volume, quality 
and pertinence of data provided with a view to improving citizens’ 
information on various spending options and to assessing the serv- 
ices they receive from the state. 
Another facet of the need to improve and enhance trust in gov- 
ernment’s services should also be examined in the cadence of the 
quest for fiscal space, both in terms of timeframe and scope. The 
significance of fiscal space is well perceived in an attempt to miti- 
gate the social and political costs of any fiscal consolidation program, 
which aims to run counter to an expansive approach of budgeting 
adopted by most governments in times of economic growth. In that 
sense, adopting a more prudent fiscal stance, especially during 
boom times, that will eventually allow for smoother cutbacks in times 
of distress and will safeguard funding of important policy commit- 
ments, is highly desirable. Given the above, as Marcel (2012) 
demonstrates in a recent study, generating fiscal space at the de- 
sired scale comes along with a generous reengineering of budget 
practices as well as comprehensive review of the temporal and in- 
stitutional framework within which budgeting is deployed. 
Alongside these terms of fiscal policymaking, governments should 
also contemplate questions of inter-temporal fiscal balance and in- 
tergenerational equity in fiscal policy reform. Although there are sub- 
stantive limitations on our ability to measure correctly the effects of 
current fiscal policies in future generations, we cannot make re- 
sponsible decisions in complete disregard of their future impact (Do- 
ran, 2008). To this end, many OECD governments have opted for 
the definition of a balanced budget on average over the long term 
with a view to assisting the measurement of long-term fiscal balance. 
Pursuant to this approach, all contemporaneous expenditure is fi- 
nanced by contemporaneous taxes and any public debt is an im- 
position upon future generations, measured in either cash or ac- 
cruals (Coombs and Dollery, 2004). 




In general, fiscal policymaking in Greece should become more 
far-sighted and inclined towards long-term sustainability. Effective 
and sustainable fiscal policymaking requires that deviations from the 
baseline scenario of long-run equilibrium are systematically and duly 
corrected, a goal which is met when fiscal behavior complies with 
specific rules that can constrain and orient it. Therefore, aligning this 
thinking with the aforementioned need to avoid inertia on the side 
of fiscal policy makers on the event of higher or lower projected 
growth can certainly revitalize hope for long-term prosperity and en- 
hanced resilience against future fiscal shocks. 
Changing the dynamics of the fiscal system can thus pay great 
dividends and can contribute to the alleviation of current and future 
fiscal burdens. But most of all, it can restore public trust by har- 
monizing policy expectations with fiscal realities in a more trans- 
parent and sustainable way. 
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In this chapter, I propose an alternative explanation of ICT imple- 
mentations that fail on their reformist intentions. I develop my argu- 
ment in the context of the Greek public administration in the mid-1990s 
examining the flagship IT project of the era, the Taxation Information 
System (TAXIS). TAXIS implementation shows how it is possible for ICT 
innovation to produce some, albeit limited, results even in rigid clien- 
telistic/particularistic environments without threatening, in any significant 
way, the strong embrace of clientelistic mechanisms over state bu- 
reaucracy. This view is in contrast with existing accounts, which adopt- 
ing a deterministic point of view, advocate further computerization of 
administrative processes in order to oblige public administration to the 
redesign and simplification of operational activities. The solution lays 
more to a change on the governance model than a need for new tools. 
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1. Introduction 
ICT innovation1, in semi-periphery countries, such as Greece, is con- 
sidered as the natural progression of the rationalization project in 
the public sector (Cordella, 2007). To this end, it is driven by a re- 
formist agenda (Ciborra & Navarra, 2003) targeting at the creation 
of a flexible, efficient and transparent government apparatus. Yet, 
several examples in the literature (e.g. Avgerou & McGrath, 2007; 
Ciborra & Navarra, 2003) show that, despite strong support from 
local governments, ICT initiatives deliver limited results. ICT imple- 
mentations remain, on many occasions, unconnected to the actual 
ways of local governments (Avgerou, 2002) mainly because the idio- 
syncrasies of the institutional context cause various deviations from 
predicted outcomes (Noir & Walsham, 2007), despite the diligent 
implementation of standard methodologies, acceptable techniques 
and state-of-the-art technological solutions. 
In this chapter, I propose an alternative explanation of ICT imple- 
mentations that fail on their reformist intentions. I show how ICT in- 
novation stumbled upon the harsh realities of a clientelistic bureaucracy 
and the unwillingness of the political system to support reform to its 
very end. For this, I examine government discourses in order to re- 
construct what were the political expectations for the project. Then I 
show how these were incorporated into system design in ways that left 
political control over taxation intact. This approach runs counter to ex- 
planations considering administrative reform an engineering project fa- 
cilitated by information and communication technologies. It focuses on 
politics in order to show how political aspirations, plans, expectations 
1 ICT innovation, as defined by Avgerou and Madon (2004: 162), “is concerned with 
design and implementation of a new technology but also addresses issues of information 
and knowledge, and it has an interest in IS-related changes of the organization and 
content of work tasks”. 




but also administrative traditions2 are constitutive of ICT implementa- 
tions. It, therefore, broadens the repertoire of available explanations for 
the limited results of several ICT projects in public administration. Most 
importantly, it problematizes instrumentalist explanations ignoring the 
idiosyncrasies of implementation contexts. 
I develop my argument in the context of the Greek public admin- 
istration in the mid-1990s. At the time, there was a wave of ICT-dri- 
ven administrative reform propelled by modernization as the pre- 
dominant socio-political imaginary. For this chapter, I focus on the 
flagship ICT project at the time, the Greek Taxation Information Sys- 
tem (TAXIS). The system was heralded as great success by the gov- 
ernment. Yet, its contribution to the rationalization of tax administra- 
tion remains a contested terrain, even to this date. The controversial 
contribution of TAXIS to tax reform in Greece provides a starting point 
to examine how political traditions stir ICT innovation into specific, fre- 
quently unintended, directions. In the following section, I discuss the 
objectives of the 1990s modernization project in order to set the con- 
text for TAXIS and its role during administrative reform. In section 3, 
I show how the government imagined the role of TAXIS in the Ministry 
of Finance. Then, I trace the influence of clientelistic/particularistic el- 
ements in the Greek political system over system implementation in 
an attempt to explain the reasons behind TAXIS’ limited outcomes in 
the front of tax evasion. Then, in section 5, I discuss these findings 
in light of relevant literature. Section 6 concludes by situating TAXIS 
in the ongoing modernization efforts of the Greek state. 
 
2. The idiosyncrasies of Greek 
public administration 
In Greece, by mid 1990s, there is a wide-spread consensus among 
political parties on the need for administrative reform. The Greek pub- 
 
2 I use Peters’ definition of administrative tradition as “an historically based set of values, 
structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appropriate 
public administration within society” (Peters, 2008) 




lic administration, despite several attempts to organize its operations 
following the example of more advanced Western countries re- 
mained a “mock bureaucracy”3 (Gouldner, 1955). The government 
apparatus was a rigid and highly politicized environment supported 
by a corpus of civil servants closely attached to the agendas of po- 
litical parties (Sotiropoulos, 2004). Consecutive governments, in an 
effort to counter-balance these properties, have established a rigid 
legal framework minutely regulating all aspects of public sector ac- 
tivity (Spanou & Sotiropoulos, 2011). Yet, this labyrinthine situation 
served primarily as a façade covering the absence of clearly de- 
marcated administrative procedures within public agencies. In real- 
ity, despite strict formality, there was a flagrant absence of instru- 
mentalism and the subsequent operational efficiency. 
The absence of instrumentalism as the underlying organizational 
paradigm in the Greek public sector should not be seen as inabil- 
ity on behalf of the Greek government to efficiently organise its op- 
erations. It reflects a long standing administrative tradition based on 
strict legalism coupled with a culture of clientelism on both ends of 
the administrative echelon which actively promoted the absence of 
paper trails, rendering practically impossible any attempts to audit 
past actions and attribute blame (Lyrintzis, 1984, 2005). At the out- 
set, this type of public bureaucracy looks burdened by extensive red 
tape further worsened by idiosyncratic administrative procedures. 
In practice, the bureaucracy is focused on thoroughly observing le- 
gal requirements, and securing ex-ante accountability, while leav- 
ing space for political parties to control their electoral clientele. In- 
strumentalism is not necessary, nor desirable in such an 
 
3 Formality, separation of person from role, objectivity of rules, hierarchical organization 
and work specialization, major tenets of modern bureaucracies, are simply emulated 
and not fully embedded in the mentality and practices of Greek public administration 
(Karvounis, 2003). Most importantly, the government apparatus is still characterized 
by authoritarian structures, inherited by its Ottoman past (Mouzelis, 2002), a strong 
embrace from the political parties which view public sector as the vehicle for the 
fortification of their control on various social groups and a clientelistic mentality 
cumulating to lack of transparency and corruption (Featherstone, 2005) 




environment. Furthermore, the absence of “esprit de corps” on be- 
half of civil servants deprives public administration from the ability 
to challenge this situation and promote better organizational arrange- 
ments. 
In the mid-1990s, the government launched an ambitious mod- 
ernization project targeting administrative efficiency but also deal- 
ing with the idiosyncrasies of bureaucratic clientelism plaguing the 
Greek public sector. ICT innovation has been identified as a top pri- 
ority. The need for extensive computerization has been stated in the 
Prime Minister’s inaugural address to the Greek Parliament4. It was 
the first time that a Greek prime minister explicitly referred to the 
important of these technologies in restructuring the government ap- 
paratus and leading the country to prosperity5. Reform was pre- 
sented as a continuous effort which intended to simplify adminis- 
trative procedures, introduce straightforward ‘managerialism’, 
prepare the ground for shifting away from large, hierarchical, bu- 
reaucratic organizational forms towards more decentralized, net- 
worked and flexible ones, emphasizing quality in ‘back office’ and, 
finally, focusing on quality of service (‘front office’), towards the cit- 
izens. Efforts were also channeled towards the transformation of the 
day-to-day administrative practices and the improvement of the re- 
lationship between the state and the citizens. 
This was a substantially different approach from previous reform 
efforts. Spanou (1996) observes that all governments had launched 
programmes targeting at clientelistic/particularistic aspects of the 
state apparatus, considered as major impediments for a efficient and 
flexible state (Tsoukas, 2007). However, most of these reforms, as 
 
4 Hansard, Period Θ’, Presidential Democracy Term, Plenary Session Α’, Session ∆’, 
Thursday, October 10th 1996. 
5 Elaborating further on the rationale for promoting computerization in the public sector, 
he writes in his memoirs: “Diffusion of technological applications in public administration 
offer many opportunities to improve services to the citizen. Automation of administrative 
procedures and networking of public agencies of first and second degree can lead to 
rapid exchange of documents, simplification of procedures and maximization of results 
to the benefit of citizens” (Simitis, 2005: 350) 




can be seen by various accounts on the matter (Spanou, 1996, 
2008; Spanou & Sotiropoulos, 2011), involved mainly changes in 
the existing legal framework in an effort to make it more strict. Pro- 
cedural aspects were seldom addressed since they were considered 
to be internal concerns of each public agency. Yet, the possibility 
of a public bureaucracy closely controlled by the state and with no 
top civil servants to establish efficient administrative procedures was 
never realistically discussed by political parties. Equally, the fact that 
instrumentalism would facilitate the emancipation of the public bu- 
reaucracy, if acknowledged, was never really desired. As a result, 
public bureaucracy remained the “great patient” of Greek society 
(Makrydimitris, 1999). 
In the mid-1990s, public sector modernization became an ICT- 
driven project. It was a political choice in tune with the precepts of 
New Public Management as well as the global advances in infor- 
mation technologies and computerization (Hood, 1995). The prom- 
ise for ICT-driven economic progress was promoting a model for pub- 
lic administrations built around information technologies now seen 
as the infrastructure upon which governments would formulate their 
strategic plans for prosperity. In the clientelistic/particularistic con- 
text of Greek public administration, ICT innovation served another 
purpose too. It was considered as an autonomous force introduc- 
ing changes in public administrations that could not be controlled 
or manipulated by local actors, such as political parties or public ser- 
vants in the case of Greece. Information technologies embodied a 
vision of order and control over complex administrative practices 
which was quite crucial during a reform effort which aimed at re- 
shaping a clientelistic public administration. 
The first government area to be reformed through extensive com- 
puterization was state finances, the backbone of all other govern- 
ment activities. It was considered a long overdue reform since com- 
puterization attempts in the Ministry of Finance dated back in the 
late 1970s. The contribution of ICT innovation to the envisaged re- 
form is discussed in the following section. 
88 SOCIAL ISSUES IN FOCUS 
 
 
3. Imagining a new tax administration 
By the mid-1990s, ICT innovation was considered the only appro- 
priate way to solve the problem of tax administration. Consecutive 
attempts to reform taxation always stumbled to administrative inef- 
ficiencies. As such, extensive rationalization of administrative prac- 
tices was seen as prerequisite for any tax reform6. There was a 
strong convictions, among government members, that an efficient 
tax administration should be in place in order to provide the nec- 
essary infrastructure for tax reform (Balfoussias, 2000). TAXIS 
(i.e. Taxation Information System) was imagined to be the catalyst 
of obsolete and burdensome administrative operations. The actual 
content of these political visions deserves further consideration as 
it was in tension with prevailing practices in Greek public adminis- 
tration. 
There are two core elements that shape the Greek government’s 
vision of ICT innovation as means for restructuring tax administration. 
The first one has to do with the imposition of order over very com- 
plicated administrative procedures. In TAXIS, the idea of order was pre- 
dominant; even the project’s acronym stands for the Greek word for 
order. The system was portrayed as an order inducing machine that 
would disentangle cumbersome administrative procedures7. This 
powerful image of TAXIS was in line with governmental intentions to 
modernize public administration and introduce processes that would 
curb clientelism and the ensuing corruption8. Order, however, was not 
so much about the way financial information would be organized. It 
 
6 This conviction originates in a seminal study (Agapitos, 1986) conducted by the Centre 
of Study and Economic Planning (KEPE) in late 1980s. In this study, tax maladmin- 
istration is identified as the major problem that prevents governments from efficiently 
planning their finances and establishing a more egalitarian tax system. Ever since 
them administrative reform has been at the forefront of the political agenda. 
7 Machine metaphors are common in all computerization efforts in the public sector. See 
(Agar, 2003) for a detailed discussion. 
8 These government plans are clear in the Prime Minister’s inaugural speech, Hansard, 
Period Θ’, Presidential Democracy Term, Plenary Session Α’, Session ∆’, Thursday, 
October 10th 1996. 




reflected more the intention to establish administrative procedures im- 
pervious to manipulation by civil servants. This understanding of or- 
der departs significantly by long standing uses of information tech- 
nologies as infrastructures that efficiently organize information in ways 
that can reveal interesting associations among data sets. It rather repli- 
cated a long-standing belief that stricter procedures sufficed to elim- 
inate clientelism and corruption. 
The accompanying idea of ‘total knowledge’ was underpinned by 
the belief that computerization was enough in itself to facilitate tax 
collection and monitoring. Although the content of such metaphor 
has never been quite clarified, total knowledge was considered a pre- 
requisite for what was the ultimate trial for TAXIS; the abolishment 
of imputed incomes as the basis for taxation. Until then, tax policy 
was done in a way incompatible to the practices of a modern state 
in command of its finances. Lack of accurate financial data, in the 
absence of a solid paper-based information infrastructure, meant 
that taxation was mainly based on imputed incomes. This practice 
was deemed socially inequitable but also inefficient since it required 
intensive controls that the Ministry of Finance was unable to perform. 
TAXIS was seen as an opportunity to group dispersed financial in- 
formation and perform systematic controls in order to have a more 
accurate depiction of actual incomes for the tax liable population. 
However, it is not quite clear how income tax would be calculated 
once TAXIS was operational. Greece has a large population of self- 
employed people considered high risk since it is difficult to estab- 
lish their actual income. To this end, PAYE systems (i.e. pay as you 
earn) which usually follow extensive computerization efforts are dif- 
ficult to be implemented. It is the citizens’ responsibility to declare 
their actual income while the state requires a very elaborate system 
of controls in order to verify the accuracy of income tax declarations. 
The reality of this, however, did not diminish the power of the ‘to- 
tal knowledge’ metaphor. 
The prevalence of metaphors of order and total knowledge are 
not unique in the case of TAXIS. They are central tropes in the ICT- 




driven reform projects. However, they mainly refer to the comput- 
erization of paper-based bureaucracies with elaborate administra- 
tive operations. In the case of the Ministry of Finance, the govern- 
ment expected ICT innovation to contribute to the establishment of 
these operations during system design and implementation. The 
magnitude of such endeavour was not clearly understood by the gov- 
ernment since ICT was considered more of a silver bullet solution 
and less a technology whose implementation had to be supported 
by a skilled bureaucracy. The realities of TAXIS’ implementation are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
4. The realities of implementation 
For TAXIS to deliver the necessary order and informational clarity en- 
visaged by the government, the system ought to (a) provide a clear view 
of the tax obligations of each tax liable Greek citizen, (b) allow for cross- 
checks between declared incomes and assets in order to impose more 
accurate taxation, (c) be a tool for further financial controls that would 
contain tax evasion. These objectives were incorporated into the sys- 
tem’s design but they never fully materialized. There were practical rea- 
sons for this. TAXIS was never designed to be a standalone system. It 
was part of a comprehensive computerization programme covering every 
activity within the Ministry of Finance. It was only then that a fully de- 
veloped information infrastructure would be in place allowing the gov- 
ernment to efficiently manage state finances. The other systems were 
never launched depriving TAXIS from important information. 
The most important impediment, however, was the absence of 
strong political support for a new tax system that would impose stricter 
controls over the population. Political rhetoric, at the time, shows a 
rather shallow understanding of what tax reform actually entailed. 
Most debates in the Greek Parliament evolved around the idea of im- 
puted incomes which was linked to social justice and prosperity. TAXIS 
in its full capacity would provide the necessary information for a more 
egalitarian allocation of tax burdens based on actual income. This new 
approach on taxation had the potential to affect powerful electoral 




clienteles, mainly the upper classes which were traditionally under- 
taxed but also the farmers who were also exempted from taxation as 
part of the state’s agricultural policy (see Dertilis (1993) for a detailed 
discussion of these issues). The government could be deprived from 
a very powerful tool (i.e. taxation) that allowed it to attract electoral 
clientele through complex web of preferential allowances9. It follows 
that no Greek government was willing to promote an information sys- 
tem that would have stripped it from its powers. 
Furthermore, there was little understanding that TAXIS would im- 
pose stricter monitoring of the population. The breadth of information 
to be collected and the range of controls necessary to accurately cal- 
culate tax income for the Greek taxable population were never fully 
grasped by the political system. And even if they were, a fully opera- 
tional TAXIS could not gain public acceptability from a population with 
ambivalent stance towards the state. The collection of comprehensive 
data about economic activities was treated with suspicion since it raised 
fears over increased state surveillance10. Citizens were reluctant to give 
more information to a state seen as deeply corrupted. Tax monitoring 
was raising questions on function creep and the use of the data for 
non-financial purposes. Furthermore, there were concerns that mid- 
dle classes would be further taxed as a result of computerization while 
taxation for the upper classes and farmers would remain the same. To 
this end, the system risked of losing public support. As a result, the gov- 
ernment felt significant pressure. 
These deeply ingrained mentalities affected system implemen- 
tation. It was an indirect influence since the government would not 
back reforms that could hamper its election prospects11. The solu- 
tion out of this was implementing a system that targeted mainly 
 
9 See Bronchi (2001) for a detailed discussion on preferential allowances in taxation. 
10 In the daily press at the time TAXIS is equaled to Big Brother. 
11 Government support is crucial in the Greek public sector since top-level decision making 
is done by advisors that are not permanent administrative personnel but close collabora- 
tors of each Minister. To this end, support is something more that an issue of securing 
financial resources. It has also to do with the staffing of the project at its top level. 




street-level bureaucratic inefficiencies. Tax evasion, mainly from the 
self-employed, was considered the root cause of tax inequalities. To 
this end, TAXIS was designed to introduce rigid routines and time- 
frames that could not be subverted by users (i.e public servants and 
citizens). Everybody had to comply with existing procedures and re- 
spect the deadlines. Tax evasion was curbed but it was a small vic- 
tory since it referred to parts of the taxable population that were easy 
to monitor even before. The more extensive information infrastruc- 
ture necessary for a more equitable tax system was never materi- 
alized. To this end, TAXIS could not pave the way, as envisaged, for 
a more ambitious restructuring of taxation that would change how 
financial information was codified and administered by the Ministry 
of Finance. This was not a technical issue. It was a political one since 
it necessitated a shift in political culture that never occurred. This 
issue is further discussed in the following section. 
 
5. Can ICT innovation transform administrative 
traditions? 
In his account of the role of technologies in shaping government op- 
erations, Agar (2003) observes, that “the decisive act of state 
power is one of simplification, and of course information technolo- 
gies are deeply intertwined with this process” (Agar, 2003: 13). 
Such observation accurately reflects the vision of governmental or- 
der, through technological systems, promoted by global reform 
paradigms such as the New Public Management (NPM). Simplifi- 
cation, here, should not be viewed as the simple restructuring of ad- 
ministrative processes though computerization. It rather suggests a 
vision of public administration with clearly defined objectives re- 
garding its role within society and specific accountability structures. 
It also presumes that state bureaucracy will also have systematic in- 
formation over the domains it oversees. 
However, simplification has different meanings in different con- 
texts. In the case of Greece and the computerization of its tax sys- 
tem, simplification has been understood as the imposition of order 




over an unruly tax bureaucracy. Reform has been equaled to the 
containment of clientelism and ensuing corruption. Nonetheless, as 
already explained, clientelism is also the principal way through 
which social groups are incorporated into the political system. The 
Greek bureaucracy has been dominated by clientelistic mechanisms 
aiming at the allocation of power and benefits to its adherents. It is 
obvious, therefore, that computerisation in itself could not establish 
a new model of operational logic in the Greek tax system. To this 
end, TAXIS targeted mainly street-level clientelism within state bu- 
reaucracy. Its design reproduced long standing beliefs on the ne- 
cessity of rigid procedures to prevent illegal dealings among pub- 
lic servants and citizens. 
There are specific reasons why ICT-driven administrative reform 
was essentially framed as a street-level phenomenon. The most 
prominent of which concerns the reflexive nature of ICT imple- 
mentation process. The development and implementation of infor- 
mation and communication technologies is a reflexive practice re- 
vealing the inner workings of every organizational arrangement. This 
view is also supported by Ciborra (2005) who considers ICT driven 
change an interplay between ordering and revealing. The automa- 
tion of work practices and the extensive re-engineering, accompa- 
nying such activity, leads to the ordering of “resources, processes, 
people and relationships” (Ciborra, 2005: 261). This way, infor- 
mation technology reveals the mechanism and interrelationships be- 
tween the various constituent parts of organisational activity. This re- 
vealing highlights aspects of everyday activities, which remained 
unquestioned because of their frequent use. Thus, ICT driven 
change has the potential to change long-standing practices by 
bringing them to the spotlight (Zuboff, 1988). 
The process of reflexive appreciation of existing practices dur- 
ing ICT-driven administrative reform generates a negotiation space 
containing the possibility for both success and failure. Dominant po- 
litical actors may endorse the framings related to state moderniza- 
tion. Nevertheless, technology-induced changes in administrative 




practices are not always welcomed despite rhetorical endorsement. 
Distractions of long-established rational accounts on the existence 
and appropriateness of strongly engrained relationships may result 
in actions neutralizing instrumentalisation attempts. Dominant ac- 
tors acknowledge the necessity of technological innovation. However, 
change of routine practices is a difficult one. It triggers resistance 
on behalf of dominant actors wishing to preserve the status quo. 
The case of TAXIS shows that resistance is not a straight-forward 
phenomenon. Dominant institutional actors, as we saw, can engulf 
ICT driven change with long-established practices and instill new im- 
ageries with old understandings. Thus, ICT driven change is infused 
by elements of the hosting institutional context which inhibit its re- 
formatory potential without openly questioning its necessity. Unlike 
the dynamic nature of ICT innovation as a trigger for state reform, 
its neutralization is a covered process done in a piecemeal fashion. 
ICT innovation is neutralized by being implicated in mundane every- 
day material practices which bent its reformatory power. If IT artifacts 
cannot be unpacked once rigidified into black-boxes, the accompa- 
nying organisational practices remain quite malleable. Dominant ac- 
tors, at various levels of social hierarchy, can influence ICT innova- 
tion at this layer without looking like technology-rejecting Luddites. 
TAXIS implementation shows how it is possible for ICT innovation 
to produce some, albeit limited, results even in rigid clientelis- 
tic/particularistic environments without threatening, in any signifi- 
cant way, the strong embrace of clientelistic mechanisms over 
state bureaucracy. Thus, the political system felt confident enough 
to allow wide-spread implementation of ICT and endow state bu- 
reaucracy with an image of modernity which covered old-workings 
and mentalities. Nonetheless, this approach to ICT innovation was 
not without repercussions. Subsequent computerization efforts, 
now organized into comprehensive framework programmes target- 
ing several sectors of government activity, followed the same path 
of automation without radical changes in the actual working of pub- 
lic organizations. As a result, Greek state bureaucracy was caught 




in the downward spiral, observed in ICT for development projects, 
where poor results are attributed to the lack of a comprehensive dig- 
ital environment leading to even more ICT implementation which 
nonetheless fails to go below the surface and influence deeply en- 
trenched practices and mentalities. 
Such findings provide a different explanation for the existence of 
successful ICT innovation projects, which nevertheless do not have any 
long-term results in the government apparatus. The cause for this par- 
adox is not the government’s inability to properly implement and sus- 
tain ICT innovation. It has more to do with how the political system is 
governing its population and whether the underlying premises of ICT 
innovation fit with this model. This view is in contrast with existing ac- 
counts (e.g. Layne & Lee, 2001; Wyld, 2004), which adopting a de- 
terministic point of view, advocate further computerization of admin- 
istrative processes in order to oblige public administration to the 
redesign and simplification of operational activities. The solution lays 
more to a change on the governance model than a need for new tools. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The contribution of TAXIS to the reduction of administrative burden in 
the Ministry of Finance remains a contested terrain. After more than 
a decade from its initial roll-out and full scale operation TAXIS role to 
tax reform still raises heated confrontations among Greek political par- 
ties. TAXIS completion was a success in itself for a public sector that 
until now had a record of semi-finished and abandoned IT projects 
which impeded even the old paper-based practices. In this respect, 
TAXIS made a significant contribution since it managed to standard- 
ize administrative processes. However, it failed to instill a new un- 
derstanding on how a modern state manages its finances. As a result, 
its contribution to the efforts to battle tax evasion and boost income 
collection was as limited as previous paper-based practices. 
Irrespectively of such mixed results, the Greek political system 
did embrace ICT innovation as core ingredient of a modern public 
bureaucracy. However, the reason behind this acceptance, despite 




the revealing properties of ICTs discussed in the previous section, 
rests on the way the government managed to maintain long-stand- 
ing clientelistic practices which perpetuated its control over the state 
apparatus. TAXIS implementation showed political parties that it is 
possible to computerize administrative operations without revealing 
the tight relationship between politics and public administration. By 
framing tax computerization as a primarily administrative problem 
it managed to avoid a more comprehensive simplification of the tax 
system. Thus, it preserved the particularistic properties of the tax sys- 
tem with its generous individual allowances and the web of prefer- 
ential incentives for the business sector. 
Most importantly, ICT-driven reform allowed the government to 
delegate a portion of responsibility to technology itself. Failure to con- 
tain tax evasion was now attributed to technology. Subsequent gov- 
ernments also used ICT as the scapegoat for several fallacies of tax- 
ation. A view shared also by citizens who did not see new 
technologies to bring tax equity and justice. It is therefore safe to 
say that the new era of ICT driven modernization in Greek public ad- 
ministration was not about actual reform. It was rather a ceremo- 
nial process since subsequent computerization efforts never con- 
tested the basic tenets of Greek public bureaucracy. Most projects 
were infrastructural while service-oriented ones were simply au- 
tomating existing practices under the assumption that systematiza- 
tion of information would eventually lead to the restructuring of ex- 
isting administrative procedures. 
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This paper provides an empirical exploration of the transformations in 
Modern Greek society, by assessing subjective experiences and eval- 
uations in relation to the Greek Crisis. The investigation concerns whether 
change in everyday life deriving from the Greek crisis also involves an 
alteration in the ways that Greeks perceive and consider social reali- 
ty and themselves within it. This study supports the view that social re- 
ality in modern Greek society is currently reshaped and this is relat- 
ed to the fact that Greeks have started reorganising their ways of think- 
ing and behaving. Participants reported that practices, norms and men- 
talities inherited by previous generations are no longer helpful. Cus- 
toms (such as clientelism) and mentalities (such as prioritizing the per- 
sonal over the collective interest) must now change and be reformed 
as the new reality demands different ways of thinking and rapid adap- 
tation to a new way of living which has become economically restricted 
and politically unstable. In this sense, Greeks are becoming reflexive 
towards the present situation and themselves within it and critical to- 
wards the past and future, as they consider what part of the older gen- 
Transformations 
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Subjective Experiences 
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eration’s established mentalities to retain and what aspects of their way 
of living will alter. 
Keywords: Transformations, Modern Greek Society, Crisis 
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1. Greek Society 
Greek society (possibly like every society) had always suffered, for 
a variety of reasons, from certain dysfunctions such as those ex- 
plained below. However, Modern Greek society currently (especially 
during the last two years) is undergoing additional complexities due 
to the global economic recession, which it has not been able to han- 
dle or control. For that reason, and as a member of the European 
Union, Greece has asked for the contribution of the EU and the IMF, 
which in turn have implemented a sequence of unprecedented aus- 
terity measures in their attempt to control the country’s enormous 
debt. Such measures, however, have consequently caused analo- 
gously uncontrollable destabilization in Greek society and this has 
dramatically affected the everyday lives of Greeks. Since such 
measures have not been implemented before in any other EU coun- 
try, the possible political and social consequences have not been ef- 
fectively calculated or, in many respects, even anticipated. As re- 
cession expands to more Europeans countries (eg Cyprus), this 
study may provide an initial overview of the possible social changes 
and difficulties that individuals have to confront in their everyday lives 




due to the consequences of the economic depression. As no provi- 
sion is offered in terms of restoring social stability it is considered 
vital for social scientists to be able to assess the effect of such dra- 
matic transformations on societies and individuals. 
Modern Greek society and state have suffered ongoing discon- 
tinuities over a prolonged period, which has caused significant de- 
lays in terms of social, political and economic development. A vari- 
ety of views have been employed in order to evaluate and 
understand the reasons behind the inability of Greek society to be- 
come synchronized with fellow European societies and Western cul- 
ture. Tsoukalas (2008) and Alexakis (2008), for instance, believe 
that the lack of rational organization of the Greek state allows the 
dysfunctional operation of Greek society, whereas Mouzelis and 
Pagoulatos (2003) emphasize the lack of solidarity and civil soci- 
ety. Mouzelis (2012) also believes that certain elements in the Greek 
mentality derive from the fact that Greece was under the occupa- 
tion of the Ottoman Empire for over four hundred years and that 
therefore certain customs and patterns of behaviour have been in- 
herited in the way Greek society and state operate (eg the word 
‘rousfeti’ is Turkish) . Alexakis (2008) and Voulgaris (2006) explain 
that one of the main characteristics of the Greek mentality is the ten- 
dency of Greeks to act in an individualistic manner, investing in their 
own personal rather than in the collective interest; they maintain that 
such patterns may relate to the struggle of Greeks to protect them- 
selves and their families during the ‘dark’ years of Ottoman occu- 
pation. 
Panagiotopoulou (2008) further argues that it was extremely dif- 
ficult for Greek society to follow the development and fully absorb 
the values, principles and ways of thinking of Western Europe, since 
it had been influenced by the Eastern (Ottoman) way of life during 
the time that Western Europe was evolving mentally, scientifically, 
politically and socially. Furthermore, the entire 20th century was ex- 
tremely turbulent for Greece in terms of political, social, economic 
and especially historical stability, which did not allow Greek society 




to be formed and organized freely and fully. Sotiropoulos (2004) 
adds that, after the fall of the Military Junta (1974), democracy in 
Greece was restored rapidly but not systematically and thoroughly. 
Also citing the above-mentioned reasons, Tsoukalas (2008) con- 
cludes that the Greek mentality of ‘tzampatzis’ (‘free rider’: those who 
are only concerned about their own personal benefit) is the main 
reason why Greek society remains dysfunctional and incapable of 
forming and maintaining a comprehensive and efficient state and 
effective political system. 
Greek society is currently experiencing significant economic, po- 
litical and social crisis which is also perceived in terms of change. 
Much has been written and said about the economic and political 
challenges that Greek society has to confront. However, the way 
every day Greek social reality is transformed has not received 
equal or systematic attention. Greeks are now experiencing a dif- 
ferent social reality (in relation to older generations) which is char- 
acterized, inter alia, by uncertainty, insecurity, mobility and the in- 
ability to produce specific projections for their future lives. The young 
generation in Greece, especially, has now realized that certain so- 
cial anomalies inherited from older generations will no longer 
serve, as everyday living in Greece has become more complicated, 
demanding and challenging. Such social discontinuities relate to as- 
pects of the Greek mentality which are no longer effective, such as 
the concept of ‘volema’ (to get into, or remain in, a situation/posi- 
tion that works for oneself without considering others), ‘meso’ (the 
medium – usually a political figure – who helps to accomplish what 
needs to be accomplished), ‘rousfeti’ (clientelism), and ‘ohaderfis- 
mos’ (to ‘get by’ without caring about tomorrow). 
As social, economic and political reality transform, due to ex- 
haustive austerity measures and political volatility, Greeks now 
have to confront a different way of living based on uncertainty, in- 
security, disappointment and disorientation. They need to find their 
place within a new reality which consists of high rates of unem- 
ployment, increasing suicide rates (over 40 per cent increase dur- 




ing the last year), repeated reductions in salaries and pensions, con- 
tinuous lack of trust (in politicians and in one another), unprece- 
dented austerity measures, and political and social instability (in- 
cluding the rise of extreme fascist party). For Nesbit (1970: 328) 
“no substantial change in social group or organisation, or in the 
structure of any form of social behaviour, takes place except under 
the impact of events that cause crisis”. This new social reality that 
Greeks are experiencing requires an ability to adjust rapidly and an 
awareness of social transformations. In this sense, Greeks, and par- 
ticularly the young generation, are now called upon to reform 
Greek society and also to be reformed by it. The way that this two- 
directional adaptation is taking place is the focus of this study. 
 
2. Social Transformation 
The ways societies are transformed and reorganised have been de- 
scribed in a variety of ways, however the main idea remains that so- 
cial change concerns “relatively lasting transformations of social fea- 
tures, such as structures and institutions, norms, values, cultural 
products and symbols” (Calhoun, 1992, cited in Silbereisen et al., 
2007: 73); it may occur gradually or become the result of sudden 
and dramatic transformations of political, social and economic in- 
stitutions (Pinquart and Silbereisen, 2004: 289). The case of Greek 
society falls into the second category since most of the economic and 
political alterations implemented are a result of rapid and dramatic 
transformations over the last two years. In current literature an in- 
terest has been displayed in the effect of social change on individu- 
als. Although for Adams social change cannot be understood in its 
totality (Adams, 2007:1), according to Pinquart and Silbereisen 
(2004), social change affects social institutions as well as psycho- 
logical development; they add that, in relation to social change, con- 
straints on individuals are not stable. It thus seems that social 
change not only takes place on a collective/social level, but also 
touches upon individual aspects. It is also important to note that 
Greeks perceive the economic, political and social alterations in 




Greece in terms of ‘crisis’, rather than ‘transformation’ or ‘restruc- 
turing’. Possibly the reason for this is, as Elder (1974:10) explains, 
that “crisis refers to the gap between the socioeconomic needs and 
the ability to satisfy them”, which describes accurately the current 
situation in Greece. 
Pinquart and Silbereisen et al. (2007: 76) further argue that the 
way individuals handle such changes depends on their resources and 
opportunities, whereas they are also constrained by these and by so- 
cial transformations; they conclude that human agency is dramati- 
cally affected by structural forces. Elder (1999) maintains that hu- 
man agency is limited by social, historic and economic change and 
Silbereisen (2005) adds that societal progress is related to ‘agen- 
tic’development. Individuals are influenced by social change and this 
could be seen as an inevitable parameter. Hughes explains that 
“some people come to the age of work when there is no work, oth- 
ers when there are wars…Such joining of a man’s life with events, 
large and small, are his unique career, and give him many of his per- 
sonal problems” (Hughes, 1971: 124). The way each individual han- 
dles such significant events in life is what makes the difference. The 
Greek case offers an example of a society undergoing significant po- 
litical and economic transformations that influence everyday life 
and peoples’ way of thinking, and, as Elder (1974: 10) explains, “cri- 
sis situations are a fruitful point at which to study change since they 
challenge customary interpretations of reality and undermine es- 
tablished routine”. 
The manner in which individuals react to the Greek crisis offers 
an exceptional insight into the way(s) that Greek society is being re- 
shaped since, as May (2011: 374) explains, people respond to so- 
cial change in a “fragmentary fashion” and she clarifies that the way 
people are affected by social changes relates to the gradual alteration 
of their ways of thinking as well as to their habits and routines. May 
maintains that, as people behave and think differently or as they re- 
sist doing so, they actually contribute to further social transformations. 
Mouzelis (2008: 99) explains that, in order to understand social 




change, we should “focus on how actors handle contradictions, how 
conscious they are of incompatibilities between institutions, what they 
do in order to maintain or change the contradictory status quo”. 
Therefore, in order to examine how Greek everyday life is reshaped, 
we need to explore whether and how Greeks have altered aspects 
of their habits, routines and ways of thinking or, in more general 
terms, the way they perceive social reality. 
 
3. Methods 
Participants and Procedure: thirty two semi-structured, in-depth in- 
terviews (Bryman, 2008) took place in Greece during August and 
September 2011 and 2012. The selection criteria of the participants 
included: age group: 20-55, average age: 35.1, four coming from 
the sub-group (20-25), five from (25-30), five from (30-35),six from 
(35-40), seven from (40-45), two from (45-50), and three from the 
subgroup (50-55); as equal a distribution of gender as possible (12 
male, 20 female); geographical allocation in terms of size and prox- 
imity to the capital. 
Participants were in: Athens, the capital (population: around 
5,000,000, Thessaloniki: around 1,000,000 (the second biggest 
Greek city), Ermoupolis, a town on the island of Syros, as a relatively 
proximal, peripheral, medium-sized town (population 13,000, 77 
nautical miles from the capital), and Eresos, a village on the island 
of Lesbos island, as a small village on a remote, peripheral island 
(population: 1,600, 190 nautical miles from the capital) . Partici- 
pants came from upper, middle and lower socio-economic and class 
background (16: medium, 11: upper, 5: lower class). Most were em- 
ployed (22/32). Most were married (18/32), few were parents 
(11/32) and many had university degrees (20/32). 
Limitations: a main issue raised during interviews relates to the 
possible bias that might have occurred by the researcher’s subjec- 
tive interpretations regarding the interviewees’ responses. The re- 
searcher’s subjective evaluation and understanding is indeed one 
of the main limitations in qualitative research. However, in this case, 




the researcher’s Greek origin and deep contextual understanding 
of Greek society (in terms of language, culture, social norms and 
mentalities) allowed the interpretation of the meaning of the par- 
ticipants’ views as accurately as possible, as opposed to a re- 
searcher coming from a totally different culture. Possibly, an addi- 
tional quantitative component of this study might have contributed 
more measurable and generalizable findings; nevertheless, this 
study as it presently stands, offers an initial, albeit indicative, analy- 
sis of the tendencies related to the organisation of every day Greek 
reality. 
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
The main frames of analysis were organized according to partici- 
pants’ experiences associated with: a) present, b) past, and c) fu- 
ture. The areas of focus were informed by the main aim of the re- 
search, namely to discover whether the changes in everyday life 
deriving from the crisis that Greeks are experiencing also involved 
an alteration in the ways that Greeks perceive and consider social 
reality and themselves within it. 
 
4.1 Present 
The main themes emerging from the interviews in relation to how 
Greeks perceive Greek society involve uncertainty, disappointment, 
pessimism, insecurity, fear, anger, negativism, pressure, anxiety and 
depression. More specifically, participants discussed the lack of trust 
towards politicians and the disappointment they felt. Very charac- 
teristically, some of them said things like: “Nothing works, there is 
no meritocracy, nobody cares for our country’s interests” (Antonis, 
29, Syros) or “I think that nobody of those who govern this coun- 
try is interested” (Petros, 30, Syros). Participants perceived current 
Greek society in very pessimistic terms. They expressed negativity, 
pessimism and disorientation, particularly regarding any specific 
plan to improve their everyday lives: “We see our dreams get de- 
stroyed and our hopes for a better future disappear” (Emma, 27, 




Athens), “The way Greeks live their lives has now changed; now 
things are worse” (Amy, 38, Eresos), Most of them mentioned that 
the situation had always been difficult and unfair, but that now they 
had lost their hope for a better future. “Even if the financial situa- 
tion will be resolved, the feeling of security that we once had, will 
never come back” (Mara, 52, Thessaloniki). They felt cornered and 
cross as they explained that they were trapped in a ‘system’ (re- 
ferring to the way Greek government works) that was only con- 
cerned about maintaining its power without offering anything in re- 
turn: “we lived part of our lives in a way we didn’t deserve, but the 
system [i.e. the Greek state] allowed us to do it. They didn’t stop 
us. They even encouraged us. So if the system works in a certain 
way you have no option but to follow” (Makis, 35, Syros). 
Elder (1974: 10) explains that during periods of crisis, “control 
over situations becomes problematic when old ways are found 
lacking as means of dealing with social demands and satisfying ba- 
sic needs or standards”. It now seems that Greeks feel that they are 
losing control as uncertainty and insecurity about the future prevent 
them from producing concrete plans for the future. Especially the 
young generation experience enormous uncertainty and insecurity 
and they are trying to create their own mechanisms to cope with 
the unknown, especially regarding the working environment, as they 
also try to maintain their hope which will enable them to remain cre- 
ative and productive in the present. 
Regarding everyday life, participants explained that their way of 
living had changed dramatically and further difficulties were antici- 
pated: “Professionally there is a constant feeling of insecurity. Not to 
get fired, to be good in my job, to get along with small salaries” 
(Emma, 27, Athens), “I have started thinking things that I wouldn’t 
have thought five years ago, like getting a job abroad” (Kety, 26, 
Athens). Participants explained that their main concern was how to 
make a living, not to lose their jobs, or how to get a job. They felt that 
they had to be grateful if they were still employed although the em- 
ployment conditions were becoming more exploitative: “Professionally, 




I don’t know if I will have a job tomorrow and, personally, I have no 
desire to do anything joyful anymore. There is so much insecurity 
about everything” (Antonis, 29, Syros), “Psychologically it influences 
me a lot. If you see a society suffer and everyone in your environment 
suffer you can’t remain distant (Nicos, 35, Athens). According to 
Adams, the sense of self is likely to be troubled by the experience of 
uncertainty and lack of control over events (Adams, 2007: 13), and 
this seems to be exactly the case here. For May, the way people are 
affected by social change involves a gradual alteration in their ways 
of thinking as well as their habits and routines. As people behave and 
think differently, or as they resist doing so, they actually contribute to 
further social transformations (May, 2011: 374). It is thus seen that 
participants experience social as well as personal transformations as 
they are forced to readjust their way of coping with difficulties and get 
used to new ways of living, although it is not necessarily their choice 
to do so: “I have changed my financial plans and I have eliminated 
everyday needs” (Elias, 44, Athens), “I have to work more and I don’t 
have enough time to see my friends any more” (Emma, 27, Athens), 
“my personal life is influenced by my financial situation” (Grigoris, 34, 
Athens). For Adams, the impact of social change upon individuals and 
social groups depends on social structure and therefore is not pre- 
determined (Adams, 2007: 139). As this empirical exploration shows, 
personal concerns are influenced by structural transformations (so- 
cial/political/economic change), but each participant explains that this 
is happening in a different way as each of them is influenced dis- 
tinctively. Still, all participants have been affected by the crisis to a 
greater or lesser extent. As will be further discussed, ways of coping 
and responding to these circumstances vary, as does the portion or 
extent of responsibility acknowledged by the participants. 
 
4.2 Responsibility 
Although there is homogeneity to the answers concerning how dif- 
ficult and challenging everyday life has become for Greeks, partic- 
ipants did not blame exclusively the impairment of the Greek polit- 




ical system, the incapability of Greek politicians to provide concrete 
solutions or the hostile attitude Greeks currently perceive from fel- 
low European countries. Participants were coming to realise that 
they had contributed (even if passively) to the formation of this new 
reality and they tried to explain their own share in responsibility: “I 
might have contributed through my tolerance” (Mina, 45), “yes, by 
doing nothing” (Petros, 30); “we have all contributed” (Antonis, 29; 
Emma, 28; Melina, 32); “I have contributed through my vote and 
the reasons why I have voted for specific politicians (Soula, 51, Thes- 
saloniki). This shows that, as Archer (2007) explains, agents do not 
perceive themselves as victims of the situation or as passive receivers 
of other peoples’ decisions, although they do feel insecure, uncer- 
tain, and are afraid of the future. Although there were repeated ref- 
erences to the lack of justice, the need for punishment, the inade- 
quate health and educational systems, participants displayed a 
critical understanding of the current situation and of their own con- 
tribution and responsibility: “I tolerated a corrupted political system 
that buys votes” (Mina, 45, Eresos), “being silent means to consent” 
(Thodoris, 44, Eresos). They even became more specific when 
they revealed how they had realised that certain social discontinu- 
ities and past practices (eg the practices of ‘volema’1 and ‘rousfeti’2) 
had been harmful: “I found a job through someone I knew, through 
a ‘meso’, but I am not proud of it” (Ira, 38, Athens), “I have defi- 
nitely contributed as I wasn’t asking for receipts and avoiding pay- 
ing the vat” (Vagelis, 47, Thessaloniki). “since everyone is using a 
‘meso’3, I have to do the same, it is inevitable” (Christiana, 36, 
Athens), “some people resist, but some others are ‘volemenoi’ and 
they don’t care. (…) I have asked for a ‘rousfeti’ in the past and this 
makes me responsible” (Antonis, 29, Syros), “there are times that 
 
1 Volema: to get into, or remain in, a situation/position that works for oneself without 
considering others 
2 Rousfeti: ask for a favour 
3 Meso: the medium – usually a political figure – who helps to accomplish what needs to 
be accomplished 




I have avoided paying taxes. This means that I am part of the prob- 
lem” (Grigoris, 34, Athens). 
Archer (2007) refers to ‘reflexivity’ when she discusses the abil- 
ity of individuals to consider themselves in relation to society (and 
vice versa); the responses discussed above display this exact abil- 
ity, namely the fact that agents have critically evaluated and dep- 
recated established behaviours and practices which they have used 
repeatedly. They have come to realise what their part in responsi- 
bility is and they seem willing to change old and harmful mentali- 
ties and practices that are no longer effective. However, it would be 
prejudicial to conclude that Greek citizens are willing to bear the 
whole responsibility for the inability of the Greek government to con- 
front the dysfunctions and mutilation of Greek society. Participants 
were very critical towards Greek politicians and did not feel that they 
shared responsibility equally. On the contrary, there is an increas- 
ing demand for justice and for the punishment of those who are ac- 
countable for the prolonged downturn that Greece is going through. 
 
4.3 Future 
After discussing the views of participants regarding their disap- 
pointment about the present situation, the inevitable question that 
emerged concerned their views about the future of Greek society. 
As has been indicated, participants were able to critically evaluate 
the current social reality and they discussed their part in responsi- 
bility. It becomes clear that everyday life has changed and that par- 
ticipants had been struggling to find a way to cope with the new re- 
ality as life had become extremely unpredictable. For Jordan and 
Pile, the sociology of social change investigates “the times and places 
when and where society becomes different … [as] necessarily deal- 
ing with situations when things are strange, when the new and the 
old rub up against each other or evolve into another social form” 
(Jordan and Pile, 2002: xiv, quoted in Adams, 2007: ix). Partici- 
pants’ narratives revealed a realisation of the alteration that they had 
experienced at a personal, professional, collective and even national 




level. Although some answers involved collective actions, most re- 
sponses referred to means of personal improvement or support 
through the family: “To give an everyday example to my kids so that 
they will grow up according to certain principles” (Theodoris, 44, 
Eresos), “to be as good as I can in my job, pay my taxes and pass 
to my children the right values” (Lina, 27, Syros), “I try as friend, 
as mother, as wife to improve things on my own (…) as an individ- 
ual there is not much that I can do, but as a mother I can do more” 
(Georgia, 38, Eresos) “I want to give a better future to my child” 
(Soula, 51, Thessaloniki). Such responses reveal the significance of 
reflexivity, as they constitute clear examples of individuals who con- 
sider themselves critically in relation to social reality and vice versa. 
Furthermore, there is a tendency to disrupt habitual ways of life (eg 
‘volema’, ‘meso’ ‘ohaderfismos’); according to Elder, such disrup- 
tion produces new stimuli which elicit attention and arouse con- 
sciousness of self and others (Elder, 1974:10). It is thus seen that 
participants became critical towards themselves and that they did 
not anticipate any sort of external resolution. On the contrary they 
confronted the difficulties by considering ways of personal im- 
provement. It is also evident that resilience through the family does 
play a significant role in countering the crisis, but personal reflex- 
ivity and critical evaluation of the situation enables individuals to be- 
come more prepared. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter explored the areas of present and future in relation 
to the re-organisation of the everyday Greek reality. Regarding the 
present, participants were fully aware of the current situation, they 
were able to explain how much their everyday life had changed and 
displayed critical understanding towards the reasons behind the 
change. They also expressed critical awareness towards themselves 
as they recognized their own part in and degree of responsibility 
by outlining specific practices and harmful mentalities. This criti- 
cal stance is further supported by the fact that attitudes like those 




of ‘ohaderfismos’, ‘tzampatzis’ or ‘volema’ were not reported or 
used in the interviews. Therefore, the role of Greeks themselves in 
the formation of social change is crucial, as their way of thinking 
seems to be changing, their everyday life is becoming significantly 
different and, more importantly, they have become more critical to- 
wards themselves and more conscious of their own contribution to 
the improvement of society. So the way that Greeks contribute to 
change in Modern Greek society is related to their ability to con- 
sider the crisis in a reflexive and critical manner (Chalari, 2009), 
rather than to passively receive social, political and economic 
transformations. 
Regarding the future, participants thoroughly evaluated the on- 
going dysfunction of Greek society and explained the aspects they 
believed should be resolved. Most promoted the importance of per- 
sonal involvement and indicated ways of improving themselves and 
their own families. The above findings further support May’s (2011) 
argument regarding the way people respond to social change, 
which is related with the gradual alteration in their way of thinking, 
in their habits and routines. Participants reported a tendency to- 
wards personal improvement and subjective ways of handling dif- 
ficulties, without diminishing collective actions. Therefore, social 
change actually effects institutional as well as psychological devel- 
opment as Pinquart and Silbereisen (2004) support. Thus, it seems 
that participants have stopped anticipating that a solution to their 
problems will come from external factors (like the Greek state), and 
are trying to cope with the increasing everyday difficulties by chang- 
ing themselves, their habits, their way of life and patterns and the 
way they raise their children. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that participants provided pri- 
marily homogenous views which were not significantly affected by 
their age group, gender, social, economic or educational back- 
ground, or geographical area of origin. This means that all partici- 
pants were affected by the crisis, albeit in different ways and to dif- 
ferent degrees. Furthermore, the projections of participants 




regarding future Greek society did not relate to excessive demands 
for an easy or luxurious life. On the contrary, what becomes clear 
from their narratives is that Greek society and the Greek state have 
suffered a prolonged period of dysfunctional operation. The current 
crisis brought to the surface impairments which could no longer re- 
main hidden and the inability of Greek society and state to handle 
the crisis was fully revealed. Every society responds differently to 
such social phenomena and this is related (inter alia) to the history 
and culture of a society. As discussed, Modern Greek history dis- 
tinguishes that country from Northern European nations, since dur- 
ing the periods when Europe enjoyed stability and progress Greeks 
had to resolve their own domestic political and social discontinuities. 
This is probably the reason why Greece is currently experiencing 
the economic crisis in such an intense manner and the why Greek 
society and way of living is altering so dramatically. 
It may also be the case that Greece is signalling the beginning 
of a chain of social changes that may follow in Southern Europe 
(eg Cyprus). We need to pay particular attention to the Greek case 
and the social dimension of the crisis, precisely because it may en- 
able us to encounter possible future ‘metastases’ of the politico-eco- 
nomic discontinuities associated with recession. The Greek case can 
be seen as an example of a society that is changing in real time 
for economic, political and circumstantial reasons and Greeks 
must be perceived as agents who are actively contributing to this 
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